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Executive summary 
This report explores the unintended side-effects of sexual violence assistance in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo. While the high prevalence of sexual violence in Congo and 
the need to eradicate it is unquestioned, this research was initiated to address the growing 
discomfort about the effectiveness of programmes against sexual violence among staff 
members of involved agencies and Congolese actors more generally. The report concerns 
the unintended consequences of responses to sexual violence. These consequences risk 
undermining progress in addressing sexual violence, including the work to stop impunity, to 
raise awareness of sexual violence and to provide services offered to raped women and girls 
in DRC. An increasing number of people begin to refer to sexual violence assistance as a fond 
de commerce (business). As this might erode the Congolese constituency for combatting 
sexual violence, it is argued that sexual violence assistance needs to be reformed to become 
more effective within the Congolese context. 
The research focuses on how actors that provide sexual violence assistance interpret the 
problem, how this translates into interventions, and the negative side-effects that are 
observed. The judicial component of sexual violence assistance receives particular attention. 
The research was conducted by one Dutch and two Congolese researchers under the 
auspices of the Disaster Studies Programme of Wageningen University. It took place in North 
and South Kivu in September-November 2011. It is based on 58 semi-structured interviews 
with UN agencies, International NGOs, state actors and representatives of the legal system, 
and an analysis of 40 legal cases of sexual violence from six jurisdictions in South Kivu.
The conclusions are based on research focusing on North and South Kivu, where most of 
the funds for sexual violence are made available. They do not apply to other provinces of the 
DRC. The research relates to the ensemble of interventions and examines perceptions and 
societal responses to these interventions. The substantiation of the trends observed and the 
recognition of diversity in objectives and quality of individual programmes require additional 
research at programme level. The research has been limited to the DRC and can therefore 
not be understood as valid for other countries. Additional research would be required in 
other countries where (war-related) sexual violence has triggered international responses, 
such as Northern Uganda.
The objective of the research is to understand how actors in the field of sexual violence 
assistance interpret the problem and define intervention strategies, and how these 
programmes trigger certain adverse societal responses. 
These questions have been examined in four areas:
1. The framing of sexual violence in DR Congo.
2. The ways the understanding of violence is translated into programmes; identification of 
the activities; ways in which beneficiaries are identified; identification of the collaboration 
mechanisms and funding schemes.
3. The accumulated and unintended effects of medical, social and economic assistance to 
victims of sexual violence.
4. The accumulated and unintended effects of judicial sexual violence assistance. 
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Understanding sexual violence 
International attention of sexual violence in Congo was generated during the 1996-2002 
wars when Congolese human rights activists brought out the news of brutal mass rapes by 
(foreign) armed factions. Instances of armed violence continue until today and the ‘rape 
as war crime’ discourse continues to some extent to be relevant. However, it dominates 
perceptions of sexual violence, even though sexual violence currently mainly concerns acts 
between citizens. While sexual violence by civilians may be related to the legacy of war, it has 
additional causes in the ‘normality’ of gender relations in the DRC where women’s positions 
in social, political and cultural domains are highly restricted.
In 2006, Congo adopted a law on sexual violence. The law on sexual violence does not 
recognise rape as a war crime and excludes cases against foreign armed factions. Legal 
attention has therefore mostly been geared towards the Congolese army, and more recently 
civilians, as important perpetrators. The law recognises a variety of sexual violence crimes. 
In practice, there is little or no attention paid to crimes other than rape, partly because a 
number of these crimes constitute socially accepted customary practices around sexual 
relationships and marriage. It also fails to acknowledge that men have also been abused and 
raped, in particular during conflict by armed groups. 
Statistics and its role in problem definition
Interpretations of sexual violence trends rely on an overemphasis on statistics which are 
mostly based on case reporting. They are - largely on demand of donors - used for analysing 
the problem, raising awareness, project preparation, fundraising and reporting results. The 
limitations and shortcomings in data collection, analysis and interpretation are pervasive. 
Whereas the taboo on sexual violence was considered so stringent that this would lead to 
under-reporting of sexual violence, we also find the opposite in current practices. Among the 
factors contributing to inflated statistics are deliberate exaggeration for fund-raising, double 
counts for lack of transparency, medical treatment of non-victims in need of care, counting 
of would-be victims, and multiple registrations by beneficiaries of programmes. Unwarranted 
extrapolation of numbers derived from highly violent areas to wider geographical areas 
also contributes to over-representation, as well as a lack of specificity about when cases 
have occurred. A number of recent research projects have investigated sexual violence 
through wider population research. The use of data with extrapolations and one-liner media 
representations reinforces the stereotypical notion of war-related brutal rape. The subsequent 
representation of the DRC as ‘the rape capital of the world’ undermines the constituency 
among DRC actors for the combat of sexual violence. 
This image is further consolidated by international delegations that rely on a limited number 
of sources including famous spokes-persons, a selected number of health facilities, and 
interviews with victims that represent the most atrocious cases, often committed several 
years ago. Statistics should be approached with much more care, which is hampered by the 
strong prevailing images in which they are understood.
Actors, coordination and funding 
Assistance for sexual violence survivors has in recent years mushroomed to incorporate an 
estimated 300-400 Congolese and international professional organisation and community-
based organisations in North and South Kivu. Coordination proves to be a challenge. It lacks 
transparency about ‘what, where and with whom’ and reflection on strategic orientation 
of programming hardly occurs. Agenda setting and coordination is heavily dominated by 
the international community. As a result the motivation and engagement for coordination 
is fragmented, and local organisations feel overruled by international organisations. 
Government institutes hardly participate because of weak capacity and mutual distrust 
between them and international organisations. Coordination is also challenged by the 
presence of many organisations that are considered ‘opportunistic’. They lack concrete 
expertise and mainly have an interest in securing funding. 
From 2010 onwards, sexual-violence labelled budgets of Multi-Donor Trust-Funds (SRFF, 
Pooled Fund) and some of the biggest bilateral donor projects (for example USAID, SIDA, 
Netherlands, DFID) stand at USD 86.4 million. This figure does not include contributions 
from INGOs and private funds. Without a clear needs analysis, it is difficult to assess 
whether available funds are high or low. In comparison with other sectors, attention to sexual 
violence is high, which leads to frequent comments that the attention to sexual violence by 
the international community leads to the neglect of other problems. In comparison to other 
Multi-Donor Trust Fund themes, the SRFF sexual violence budget over a 24-month period 
(2010-2011) (USD 8.14 million) almost equals the budget for healthcare under the Pooled 
Fund (USD 10.4 million). Also, it is nearly twice the size of the budget for security sector 
reform (SSR trust fund) and education. The international contributions stand in contrast to 
the USD 7.9 million budget for the Ministry of Gender charged with sexual violence activities 
on behalf of the government (2011). Of this amount only 40% was actually paid out, and less 
than USD 1 million went into research on the status of women and coordination of sexual 
violence activities.
Types and characteristics of assistance
In the DRC, sexual violence assistance follows a multi-sectoral approach, related to the 
following activities: medical (physical rehabilitation, anti-HIV transmission treatment), 
psycho-social (de-traumatisation, family mediation to reduce rejection), economic 
(distribution of food/utensils in the form of a ‘kit’, skill-based training such as sewing, 
agricultural credits) and judicial assistance (supporting the victim during the legal procedure, 
mostly in NGO-supported mobile courts). Multi-sectoral assistance is hampered by a lack of 
effective cross-referencing between organisations. Some want to offer ‘the whole package’ 
themselves (without specific expertise) and others do not accept victims that do not fall 
under ‘their’ donor-programme. A large number of victims drop out at a certain stage, as 
medical and economic assistance is a priority for most. A lot of attention has also been given 
to raising awareness, mostly on the 2006 law on sexual violence. Socio-cultural dimensions 
of sexual violence are little addressed by awareness raising. 
Overall, activities are of a curative nature and largely geared towards female victims. Working 
on some of the root causes requires interaction with (military) perpetrators, which falls 
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outside most mandates. The earmarking of medical and socio-economic services for victims 
of sexual violence, for example for fistula operations, causes victims with other health 
problems or non-victims with childbirth-related fistulas to fall outside of the assistance 
framework. As a consequence, women that are operated for a fistula from child-birth may 
add to the statistics on sexual violence. The Panzi Hospital affirms that of last year’s 350 
fistula operations, only 1 had a direct, reported link with rape. Heal Africa reports that less 
than 3% of its fistula operations have a link with sexual violence. Underlying problems with 
reproductive health care are not recognised and addressed. Reserving services for victims of 
sexual violence and the related assumption that assistance seekers are all victims of sexual 
violence clouds the analysis and results in lack of attention to preventing birth-related fistulas 
and addressing problems resulting from teenage pregnancies. 
The curative approach to sexual violence can be understood in relation to the continuing 
dominance of short-term humanitarian funding frameworks and approaches based on post-
conflict relief and early recovery imperatives. Only recently, development-sensitive funding 
for sexual violence with attention to socio-cultural dimensions of sexual violence and gender 
dynamics have started to receive attention.
Identifying rape victims as beneficiaries
Performance-based funding modalities put pressure on organisations to assist a certain 
number of victims. Most agencies work in relatively accessible areas in North and South 
Kivu that have become ‘assistance-hubs’ at the expense of other, underserved areas. Inter-
agency competition leads to the ‘appropriation’ of victims and closed-circle referencing 
where victims are only referred to services funded by the same donor. In areas where reports 
of mass-rape occur, an influx of organisations competes over the registration of victims 
outbidding each other with promises of assistance. Such practices, combined with the 
common knowledge that funds for sexual violence are widely available, increasingly trigger 
a response among women to act as sexual violence victims. Vulnerable women in extremely 
poor conditions feel their only way to access aid is to claim rape. Most organisations turn a 
blind eye to this reality, because they assume that the social stigma associated with rape will 
deter women from reporting fake cases. None of the Congolese respondents to the research 
sustains this view, as they maintain that poor women in search of assistance see no other 
choice. Potentially, community-based approaches instead of victim-centred aid could reduce 
the number of fake reports.
The legal domain of sexual violence assistance
Impunity is an important stumbling block to eradicating sexual violence, hence the growing 
number of programmes focusing on legal assistance and justice sector reform. Impunity 
is characterised by a lack of legal operating budgets disbursed by the government, tedious 
and costly procedures, a lack of knowledge on procedures, illegally-granted temporary bail, 
prison breakouts, and practices around corruption and political influence. As a result, many 
perpetrators of sexual violence never end up behind bars.
Under pressure to combat impunity, however, an increasing number of suspects are 
(sometimes innocently) convicted on the basis of flawed proof. A growing number of people 
misuse the law to settle other types of (family) conflicts. Framing somebody for rape has 
become an effective way to ‘get somebody out of the way’ or to claim financial compensation. 
This is, for example, the case with teenage love affairs that result in pregnancy. When the 
families cannot agree on marriage or compensation for the costs of the child, sexual violence 
accusations may result. Legal awareness raising has created ‘public opinion intolerance’ 
regarding sexual violence and, combined with pressure from NGOs and the government to 
strictly apply the law, the legal system has the tendency to punish severely. 
As part of legal assistance programmes, NGOs fund mobile courts (chambres foraines). 
These are humanitarian mechanisms to bring justice to communities where no physical 
legal infrastructure exists. Although mobile courts should see all kinds of cases, they are 
almost uniquely organised around sexual violence cases and, linked with the predominant 
perception that sexual violence is caused by armed perpetrators, they are mostly targeting 
military justice. Mobile courts are set in limited timeframes (3-10 days) which compromises 
the correct follow-up of procedures. Since NGOs present the cases the court should deal 
with, they are buying in on the independence of the justice system. By consequence, judges 
face a moral obligation to convict, thus compromising the basic principle ‘innocent until 
proven guilty’. This is exacerbated because legal personnel receive compensation (primes) 
during mobile hearings from the NGOs. NGOs pay for lawyers on the side of victims, 
while suspects are usually left with unpaid, and hence unmotivated, public defenders. This 
enhances the possibility for suspects to be convicted regardless of the evidence that is 
presented.
The research examined the files of 40 legal cases. With over 40% of the accusing parties 
falling in the age-group of 14-18 years, and half of the suspects being under 25, and 25% 
of the cases involving pregnancy, the profile of a number of the cases fits with the trend 
identified by respondents of rape cases that are forwarded to court after teenage love affairs 
result in pregnancy. Thirty of the cases were brought before the court, and 19 of these 
resulted in conviction. More than half of the files only contained procedural notes, such 
as police reports, including eight out of the 19 cases that led to conviction. None of the 19 
conviction files contained the legally required medical report as evidence. Only one file made 
mention of the presence of physical proof. The legal examination of the cases resulted in the 
conclusion that 50% of the convictions lacked sufficient evidence. The cases concluded in 
acquittal are well argued, possibly out of fear on the side of judges to be criticised by public 
opinion. The convictions (19 out of 30 cases) all concern lower-class suspects and are much 
less motivated.. Nine cases received between 5 and 10 years in prison and five cases the full 
20 years. The 10 military cases all resulted in conviction in a mobile court. 
While the culture of impunity is effectively changing, it has resulted in a system that is biased 
towards producing rape convictions while the rights of suspects are severely breached. 
Judicial actors feel pressured by the zero-tolerance policy of the government, the advocacy of 
NGOs, and public opinion to convict suspects. As a result they disregard actual evidence to 
support cases and become biased and subjective in their rulings. This is even more the case 
when NGOs pay for organising the mobile court hearings and select the cases to be heard. 
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Conclusion and recommendations
The different processes that we have observed are strongly inter-related and have set into 
motion a negative spiral in which sexual violence accounts evoke responses that are prone 
to abuse by organisations and misuse by victims and non-victims of sexual violence. This, in 
turn, leads to exaggerated figures that add to the statistics evoking responses. The negative 
spiral results in the increasing commercialisation of sexual violence, where sexual violence is 
considered a business for agencies and individuals. The consequences are grave. It erodes 
the Congolese constituency for combatting sexual violence. It directs attention away from 
the socio-cultural gender relations in which much sexual violence is rooted. It leads to an 
increasing cynicism towards the problem with the result that real victims of sexual violence 
are not heard anymore. It leads to biased problem statements, policies and programmes that 
fail to address the domestic character of sexual violence, the lack of reproductive healthcare, 
the prevention of teenage pregnancies and child abuse, the malfunctioning of justice and the 
dire poverty underlying requests for assistance. To break through this negative spiral, and live 
up to the intentions of the responses to sexual abuse to prevent impunity, assist victims and 
reduce sexual violence, the response system needs to be evaluated and reformed. 
This leads to the following recommendations to international and Congolese actors 
concerned with sexual violence:
•	 There	is	a	need	to	move	away	from	the	predominant	‘rape	as	a	result	of	conflict’	
discourse. Instead, efforts need to be made to understand sexual violence in its 
context, with particular attention to its socio-cultural gender dimensions.  
•	 As	most	of	the	assistance	has	focused	on	the	relief	of	the	consequences	for	
victims, assistance programmes need to be more strongly embedded in longer-
term development approaches that deal with root causes (while continuing to 
address remaining humanitarian needs). This involves addressing gender relations, 
strengthening the position of women, fostering women’s leadership, increasing 
respect for human rights, intensifying security, justice and reform measures, and 
seeking community-based responses to sexual violence.  
•	 To	address	the	problem	of	would-be	victims	and	its	negative	consequences,	it	is	
important to recognise the underlying factors of poverty and lack of healthcare. The 
mandate of medical care must be broadened to incorporate reproductive health, 
especially to cater to and prevent women with fistulas from child-birth. Socio-economic 
interventions should be community-based and take into account the lessons learnt 
from programmes for ex-combatants.  
•	 Interventions	in	the	justice	sector	need	to	ensure	the	independent	functioning	of	
Congolese legal actors and should guarantee fair and equal procedures for all parties 
involved. Promoting convictions for sexual violence, especially through ‘quick-fix’ 
procedures in funded mobile courts, leads to severe biases in the justice system and 
the breach of the rights of suspects. 
•	 The	coordination	of	sexual	violence	programmes	needs	to	be	improved	and	made	
more integral to overall development planning. Parallel health and legal services 
targeting sexual violence victims should be avoided. The communication and 
coordination between international actors, Congolese government and civil society 
needs to be improved. The political and financial commitment of the Congolese 
government to reform measures necessary to combat sexual violence need to be 
concretised. 
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Introduction
In the course of the war in DRC, the world has increasingly been shocked by stories of sexual 
violence in the country, where women were in large numbers subjected to violent, often 
multiple, rape and sexual mutilation. Women subjected to these atrocities often find their 
lives destroyed, suffering grave physical and mental consequences, and risk being socially 
rejected by their families and communities. Terms like ‘endemic’, ‘sexual terrorism’, and ‘the 
war within the war’ have been used to describe these acts.1 While initially, reports concerned 
crimes committed by non-Congolese armed forces, in later years these were followed 
by reports of sexual abuse by the Congolese army or rebel groups and, more recently, by 
civilians. Sexual violence continues to have a high prevalence in the country.
Since the 2002/2003 peace agreements, a large and growing number of programmes have 
been implemented that aim to put a stop to sexual violence in DRC and provide services to 
its victims. While the need for such programmes is undisputed, a growing number of people 
engaged in these programmes and among the DRC population are raising questions about 
current programmes and practices against sexual violence. These questions concern the way 
the problem is framed, the focus of the programmes, the gaps in coordination and the forms 
of abuse addressed by these programmes at all levels. It is often heard that sexual violence 
has become a ‘fond de commerce’ (business). 
Critical notes on the programmes against sexual violence are predominant in personal 
conversations yet rarely find official recognition and debate. Staff members of programmes 
often realise the problematic aspects of their interventions, but find no opportunity to deal 
with them in the hectic round of implementation because their managers are worried about 
the repercussions of critique, because of numerous other challenges in their programmes, 
or because they develop blind spots for these ‘other realities’. A number of women’s 
rights activists from Congo have attempted to raise these concerns during coordination 
meetings but they encountered resistance and felt that they were seen as a ‘troublemaker’. 
A Congolese activist trying to flag her concerns felt that ‘the others looked upon us as if we 
wanted to minimalise the problem of sexual violence.’2 Indeed, there is the risk that analysing 
programmes against sexual violence critically may be interpreted as a denial of the gravity of 
sexual violence.
This report reviews the response to sexual violence in DRC and opens up a debate 
concerning its unwanted and negative side effects. The point of departure is that precisely 
because the problem of sexual violence in DRC is real and important, response programmes 
1 RFDA 2005 quoted in Bastick et al (2007, p.41).
2 Interview CNGO-F-1
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and their impact should be critically assessed in order to provide proper services, to 
bring about change for the people affected by sexual violence, and to address the societal 
processes and politico-military challenges that form its breeding ground. Our interviews have 
brought out a number of negative effects of programmes against sexual violence that are 
related to the complexity of the problem, the political, social and cultural context in DRC, and 
the false assumptions and biases in the interventions. 
This report is based on in-depth interviews with 58 staff members of agencies, and people 
working in the legal domain. We have also examined the court files of 40 rape cases in order 
to analyse the profile of the cases, the level of evidence used in court, and the outcomes of 
the cases. The research was initiated by Wageningen Disaster Studies after some exploratory 
interviews the authors conducted in Bukavu, South Kivu, in August 2010. These initial 
interviews indicated that a number of problems had arisen in relation to responses to 
sexual violence. The research focuses on two provinces in DRC: North and South Kivu. The 
choice of these provinces was dictated by the fact that the vast majority of programmes to 
combat sexual violence are concentrated in these provinces. The report does not cover other 
provinces of DRC, nor does it explore other areas where programmes on sexual violence are 
being implemented on a large scale, such as, for example, Northern Uganda. 
The report concerns the perceptions and experiences of people with the ensemble 
of interventions in North and South Kivu. There is a large diversity in the quality of 
programmes around sexual violence, and many programmes are effective and achieve their 
objectives. Observations made are thus not based on a description or evaluation of specific 
programmes, and cannot be read as a specific finding for any single programme. We are 
interested in the accumulated effects that are mostly unintended and outside the immediate 
control of any single organisation. Further research would be required at programme level 
to substantiate the trends our respondents signal in this report and to gain insight into the 
diversity of programmatic approaches of different types of agencies. In addition, research 
in other areas or countries, such as, for example, Northern Uganda, which are affected by 
high levels of sexual violence could further advance our insights. We are currently writing 
an academic journal paper on our findings. This report aims to bring our findings to the 
attention of agencies working on sexual violence in order to contribute to a discussion 
on improving the coordination and reform the interventions to become more effective in 
combatting sexual violence in the Congolese context. For this reason, the report provides a 
number of recommendations in the final chapter.
Following the Introduction, Chapter 2 presents the objectives, research questions and 
methodology of the research. Chapter3 provides insight in how the problem of sexual 
violence is understood and framed, generally and in relation to Congo. Chapter 4 discusses 
some of the difficulties in the use of statistics on sexual violence in Congo. Chapter 5 
deals with the actors and budgets involved, as well as coordination mechanisms and its 
shortcomings. It is followed by an analysis of the types of assistance in Chapter 6. Chapter 
7 treats the ways in which beneficiaries are selected. Chapter 8cprovides an analysis 
of court cases and Chapter 9 draws together the observations into Conclusions and 
Recommendations.
2
The research approach
The objective of the research is to understand how actors in the field of sexual violence 
assistance interpret the problem and define intervention strategies, and how these 
programmes trigger certain adverse societal responses. 
These questions have been examined in four areas:
1 The framing of sexual violence in DR Congo.
2 The ways the understanding of violence is translated in programmes; identification 
of the activities; ways in which beneficiaries are identified; Identification of the 
collaboration mechanisms and funding schemes.
3 The accumulated and unintended effects of medical, social and economic assistance 
to victims of sexual violence.
4 The accumulated and unintended effects of judicial sexual violence assistance. 
2.1   Methodology
The report builds on qualitative interviews with staff members working for (inter)national 
organisations, state institutes and judicial actors responding to sexual violence. It documents 
the experiences and opinions as related by these people, coupled with general observations 
collected over years of experience working in Congo by the research team. 
Basing an analysis on individual opinions expressed during the interviews presents the risk 
of generalising isolated opinions, or making some opinions more important than others. To 
address this risk, we have only incorporated those viewpoints that were shared by multiple 
informants, even though we often present a single quote expressing the point of view. 
Interviewed persons often stressed that their statements were personal and did not reflect 
the viewpoint of the organisation. We therefore do not attribute quotes to organisations 
and have instead used a codification of respondents. GOV, UN, CNGO and INGO refers 
respectively to representatives of the government, United Nations agencies, Congolese 
NGOs and International NGOs. F and M refers to female and male respondents. To allow 
cross-referencing of quotes, we have numbered the respondents of each category. UN-M-3 
thus represents number 3 of our male UN representatives.
Data were collected in Goma (North Kivu) and Bukavu (South Kivu) during a 25-day period 
from September to November 2011. In total, 58 semi-structured interviews were carried 
out of which 38 interviews were with representatives of organisations responding to sexual 
19
violence: 11 with UN agencies, 9 with international NGOs, 10 with Congolese NGOs, and 9 
with relevant political and administrative institutions. In addition, 19 interviews were held 
with representatives of the legal system (judges, court clerks, public prosecutors and court 
presidents) and legal NGOs. The research has focused on North and South Kivu provinces 
of Eastern DRC where most response programmes operate, and where the main activities 
of Congo’s National Strategy to put a halt to sexual violence are focused, as part of the 
government’s stabilisation programme (STAREC).3 The respondents were selected in such 
a way that the major sectors and organisations were included. The informants were mainly 
programme directors or programme officers responsible for specific programmes on sexual 
violence. The interview questions focused on the representation/interpretation of sexual 
violence, the focus of the organisation’s activities, coordination, the use of statistics, juridical 
assistance, unwanted side-effects, consequences of those side effects and recommendations 
proposed by the informants.4
Interviews have been complemented with literature study of policy documents on sexual 
violence that were considered strategic by respondents or that we found referenced in 
literature as key reports. In addition, legal documents, research reports and media coverage 
were incorporated. All interviewed actors were asked to share relevant documentation, such 
as project proposals, strategic plans, thematic analyses and narrative project reports. Much 
documentation from programmes, however, could not be obtained because of confidentiality 
restrictions or because their headquarters or directors did not allow it.
In order to provide insight into the legal response to sexual violence (the fourth domain 
presented above), 40 legal cases on sexual violence were analysed. The cases were taken 
from six judicial sections in South Kivu: 
•	 The	Office	of	the	Public	Prosecutor	in	Bukavu	(parquet),	10	cases
•	 The	High	Tribunal	in	Bukavu,	10	cases
•	 The	Court	of	Appeal,	5	cases5
•	 A	decentralised	tribunal	in	Kavumu6,	5	cases
•	 The	Military	Tribunal	in	Bukavu,	5	cases
•	 The	Military	Court,	5	cases
All cases concerned rape, with two cases including an additional offense (one sexual 
harassment, one indecent exposure). We selected those cases whose file was physically 
present in the office as there are many more cases listed than files in the offices. To allow 
proper analysis, the focus had to be on files that were complete. In many cases, files were 
empty or had only very little information. We purposefully selected cases to represent:
•	 30	first	degree	cases	and	10	appeal	cases	(second	degree).7
•	 10	cases	from	military	tribunals.
•	 10	cases	that	were	never	prosecuted	(classé sans suite).
•	 Cases	from	2007	onwards,	with	the	majority	handled	in	2009-2010.
3 DRC government (2009).
4 See annex 3 for a more complete list of interview questions. 
5 The file of the cases from the Court for Appeal included documents of both the 1st and 2nd degree. 
6 The tribunal in Kavumu is operating under the High Tribunal of Uvira.
7 The second degree cases studied concerned different cases from the ones studied on first degree. 
The analysis focused on a quantitative description of the case, including the age of the 
victim and defendant, the relation between both parties, the type of charge, the involvement 
of pregnancy, the length of treatment (time), the type of hearing (mobile court or not), 
the conclusion of the case and - where relevant - penalties involved.8 The data in the files 
were further analysed and classified according to the following qualitative questions and 
indicators:
•	 What	can	be	noted	in	terms	of	differences	in	handling	of	cases	by	civil	and	military	
courts?
•	 What	can	be	noted	on	the	status	of	the	defendant?
•	 What	type	of	crucial	evidence	was	lacking	in	the	files?	
•	 What	can	be	noted	about	the	judge’s	motivation	not	to	prosecute	and/or	to	acquit?
•	 What	can	noted	about	the	legal	argumentation	underpinning	the	court’s	conclusion?
•	 What	can	be	noted	about	the	type	of	penalty	applied	in	convictions?
•	 What	is	the	overall	impression	on	the	quality	of	legal	proceedings	of	the	studied	cases?
We then assessed for each case how the judge’s motivation was built on the evidence 
represented in the file, and whether the evidence was of sufficient quality and scope to 
justify the court’s decision. In situations where cases were not followed-up, we looked for 
the underlying explanation. The 19 interviews with legal representatives were mostly held 
in relation to specific cases. While major data gaps were found in the files, the data were 
interpreted by triangulating them with insights generated from the interviews.
The research was carried out under the auspices of Professor Dorothea Hilhorst of the 
Disaster Studies Group of Wageningen University, with financial support from the Klein 
Hofwijck Foundation. The primary researcher was Nynke Douma. Two Congolese lawyers and 
researchers assisted in the data gathering. Mrs Jocelyn Matabara (lawyer and researcher) was 
responsible for the judicial case analysis in South Kivu. Mr Florent Sangara (lawyer currently 
working for an international organisation) assisted in interviews and literature study in North 
Kivu. In total 35 days were spent in the field. 
8 See annex 3 for the list of themes and questions that guided the analysis of judicial cases. 
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Understanding sexual violence in 
DR Congo
The term sexual violence is subject to a range of interpretations, both in literature as among 
local communities, (international) NGOs, political and legal frameworks and international 
donors and the media. This chapter argues that in the DRC, sexual violence continues to be 
strongly associated with war-time rape, even though sexual violence has shifted to a civilian 
character and become part of the ‘normality’ of post-conflict society. As a result, there is 
little acknowledgement of socio-cultural notions of sexual violence that are rooted in gender-
perceptions and practices. 
3.1   General perceptions on sexual violence
Internationally, rape did not receive much attention until the women’s movement of the 
1960s started calling attention to it. Until that time, rape was largely perceived as a rare and 
isolated event. It was analysed from a biological point of view and was believed to originate 
in sexually deviant behaviour.9 From the 1970s onwards, a multidisciplinary approach to 
sexual violence became predominant, resulting in a variation of definitions that each bore a 
disciplinary basis (medical, legal, psychological, political, social, or cultural).10 From a socio-
cultural perspective, sexual violence became increasingly linked to status, dominance, control 
and power.11 Rape, in this perspective, is related to gender roles and linked to perceptions 
and practices of masculinity and femininity. 
Sexual violence literature largely defines men as perpetrators and women as victims, 
reinforced by the widespread use of the term ‘violence against women’ which is by the UN 
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women defined as ‘any act of gender-
based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological 
harm or suffering of women’.12 Even though it is acknowledged that men can also be victim 
of sexual violence, the attention goes almost exclusively to women because women are 
considered to be more vulnerable to such type of abuse. Also, men usually do not report it 
out of shame, confusion, guilt, fear and stigma. Masculinity and victimisation are seemingly 
incompatible, leaving male victims psychologically and socially extremely vulnerable.13
9 White, in Travis (2003, p.283). One of the first groundbreaking books on the matter was written by Susan Brownmiller (1975, Against Our 
Will). 
10 White (2003).
11 Travis (2003, p.1).
12 Watts and Zimmerman (2002, p.1232).
13 Sivakumaran (2007, p.255).
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Sexual violence encompasses a wide range of offenses, ranging from sex-based 
discrimination and subordination (e.g. forced marriage, lack of freedom and civil 
participation) to violent sexual abuse (e.g. sexual assault, rape) and sex-based human 
trafficking (e.g. forced prostitution). Legislation repressing sexual violence addresses one or 
more of these various forms of sexual violence. The extent of legislation differs per country. 
The correspondence of legal definitions with cultural perceptions on sexuality, sexual violence 
and gender roles varies as well for different countries. Particularly noteworthy is that public 
opinion worldwide, often tends to blame female victims for having provoked the violence 
because of disobedient or culturally offensive behaviour.14
3.2   Sexual violence in the context of conflict
Attention to sexual violence in DRC first appeared during the 1996-2002 wars when local 
organisations especially were confronted increasingly with large numbers of women and 
girls that had been brutally mass raped by armed factions. Perpetrators were, in these years, 
mostly identified as armed factions from neighbouring countries, such as the Rwandan 
Interahamwe/ FDLR (Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda) and the Burundian 
FNL (Forces Nationales de Libération) and FDD (Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie).15 
Sexual violence became understood as an ‘imported’ crime, even though it has now become 
clear that local military actors such as the Mai Mai groups present in Congo also committed 
these crimes.16 Moreover, sexual violence also became increasingly seen as a Congolese 
military problem. This focus partly coincided with broader attention to human rights abuses 
within the police and army, resulting advocacy to reform the security sector. It was also 
motivated by reports that pinpointed FARDC soldiers among the main perpetrators of 
documented sexual violence. For example, in 2007 the UN found that 54% of reported cases 
over the first six months of that year were committed by the army.17
Various scholars argue that during conflict, sexual violence, and in particular rape and 
extreme forms of sexual subordination (e.g. sexual slavery) and mutilation, are likely to 
occur. They argue that such crimes are rooted in pre-conflict socio-cultural practices linked to 
gender18 but become apparent during war when they are linked to and exacerbated by policy 
decisions and military strategies.19 In war settings, rape is linked to control, punishment, 
status, ceremonies (e.g. fetishism), peer pressure, bargaining power20 and often intermingled 
with sexual needs and desire.21 For example, it is reported that in the case of the August 2010 
mass rape of an estimated 387 women in Luvingi by the Mai Mai Sheka, the commanders 
had deliberately adopted this as a strategy to attract attention and ‘negotiate’ their way to 
the negotiation table.22 At the extreme end, sexual violence becomes a means to control 
reproduction of ‘the enemy’, either by raping to deliberately impregnate (enforcing women 
14 Watts and Zimmerman (p.1233). 
15 The Interahamwe are the militia that were behind planning and executing the Rwandan genocide (1994) and most of them have since fled to 
DRC where they exercise a lot of violence. In Burundi, following the 2003 peace agreements, the FDD now forms part of the government. The 
latest ceasefire between the government and the FNL was concluded in 2008.
16 Pratt and Werchick (2004, p. 9).
17 Human Rights Watch (2009, p.21).
18 Bouta, Frerks and Bannon (2005, p.33).
19 Turshen (2001, p.56).
20 Patricia Rozée (quoted in Pratt and Werchick, 2004, p.8-9).
21 Baaz and Stern (2009, p.498).
22 Autesserre (2012, p.16).
to bear children of the opponents) or by raping and mutilation to affect women’s fertility and 
hence the reproduction potential of communities.23 A number of studies have focused on the 
motives of rape among armed perpetrators in Congo, claiming that understanding their point 
of view would better help to tackle its root causes.24
3.3   Legislation on sexual violence
The ‘rape as war-crime’ reality in Congo provided the basis for the advocacy of a national 
and international legal framework to address rape and stop impunity.25 Organisations 
pressed for the adoption of a law that would incriminate rape as a weapon of war under 
Congolese and international law. Lobby efforts resulted in the adoption in 2006 of the law on 
sexual violence. In line with international legislation, the law incorporates 16 types of sexual 
violence, including rape26, sexual harassment, the abuse of one’s position (money, power) to 
obtain sexual favours, forced marriage, underage marriage, pimping and forced prostitution. 
The penalty for sexual violence ranges from five to 20 years in prison and a fine of maximum 
FC 200,000 Congolese Francs (approximately $200). The judge may also decide upon 
a compensation for the victim to be paid for by the perpetrator, or by the state when the 
perpetrator is a state official (e.g. soldier). 
Although the law was triggered by attention to rape as a weapon of war, it failed to provide 
a framework for dealing with rape committed by foreign armed factions as international war 
crime. Hence, and to the dismay of Congolese human rights associations, the law is only 
capable of dealing with rape committed by Congolese, whether they are soldiers, rebels or 
civilians. As a civil society advocate stated: ‘We wanted the law to incorporate sexual violence 
as an international crime, but it became a law for the small people’.27 Even though Congo 
has ratified international treaties that make it possible to prosecute wartime-rape under 
international legislation (for example through the International Criminal Court), in practice 
this is a long and complicated process that is beset by complications in fact-finding and lacks 
political support in Congo in favour of war-lord protectionism.
3.4   Sexual violence as a civil problem
After conflict, it is generally observed that sexual violence occurs more frequently in civilian 
and domestic settings, which is explained by scholars as the result of an eroded sense of 
manhood and militarised masculine control-seeking identities.28 This also appears to be true 
in Congo where an increasing number of civilians are currently identified as rapists. It has to 
be noted that civilian sexual violence may still be conflict-related, as many of the perpetrators 
are (auto)-demobilised and often severely traumatised ex-rebels and ex-soldiers that took 
23 Patricia Rozée (quoted in Pratt and Werchick, 2004, p.8-9)
24 See for example Kelly (2010), Human Rights Watch (2009) and Baazand Stern (2009).
25 Smits and Cruz (2011, p.2); Muchukiwa (2010, p.6); interview CNGO-F-1; interview CNGO-F6/F7; interview INGO-F-5.
26 Journal Officiel de la RDC, August 2006, lawnumber06/018 modifiant et complétant le Décret du 30 janvier 1940 portant Code pénal congo-
lais. The code defines rape as: the penetration of the penis or any other body part or object into the sexual organs or any other body-entrance 
of the victim, by making use of violence, serious threats/psychological pressure.
27 Interview CNGO-F-1
28 Bouta, Frerks and Bannon (2005, p.38). 
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their violent behaviour ‘back home’.29 In addition, men who have been forced to witness – 
or even take part in - rape of their wives or family may sometimes resort to sexual violence 
themselves (Harvard Humanitarian Initiative 2009). 
However, a fair share of sexual violence (whether military or civilian) is intertwined with 
existing gender dynamics and traditional socio-cultural practices that vary among tribes in 
Congo.30 Albeit forbidden by customary rules and regulations, rape incidents also occurred 
before the wars and were mostly settled by customary courts, through fine payments in 
natura or by arranging a marriage between the rapist and the victim. One of the reasons 
why people find it difficult to recognise other types of abuse as sexual violence, stems 
from accepted traditional practices that persist such as underage and arranged marriages, 
leverate31, sororat, orrapt.32 Cultural definitions that label such practices as sexual violence 
are absent.33 Likewise, sexual violence perpetrated by husbands may be considered a ‘normal’ 
part of male dominance where sexuality is one of the many domains in which husbands may 
demand obedience. The notion of gender equality that is at the basis of the term ‘consent’34 
is very remote from the current gender roles, where the positions of and spaces for women 
are severely curtailed in political, economic, social and cultural domains. Socio-cultural 
realities and community perceptions of sexual violence thus differ from the definitions of the 
law.
In all situations the social and family fabric of communities is severely disrupted and 
undermined as a result of fear, trauma, stigmatisation and rejection of rape victims.35 
What becomes clear from the above is that the understanding of sexual violence in DRC 
is predominantly centred on war-related crime and security problems. This raises different 
problems. The attention to sexual violence as the major consequence of war leads to a 
neglect of other war atrocities like killing, forced labour, forced conscription of child soldiers, 
or torture.36 On the other hand, the conflict-centred understanding of sexual violence 
leads to neglect of sexual violence as rooted in the ‘normality’ of socio-cultural processes, 
including gender dynamics within Congolese society.37 In public opinion and international 
attention alike, rape is understood as an extraordinary act triggered by the legacy of war. ‘On 
international level gender dynamics capture people’s attention and sympathy to a lesser 
extent than the cruel dynamics of war-rape, and on social level in Congo cultural causes of 
rape is something people don’t want to hear about.’38 Or, as another respondent stated, 
‘the focus has been on conflict-related rape because it is so horrible that it attracts more 
attention’.39
However, as Pratt and Werchick state, ‘combating gender-based violence will not be 
effective without changing the culture of violence and providing alternatives for militarized 
29 Human Rights Watch (2009, p.16). 
30 Muchukiwa (2010) provides a detailed study into the cultural notions linked to sexual violence. 
31 International Alert (2005, p.27). Leverate refers to the practice whereby aman inherits the wife of his late brother. When the wife of a man dies 
and he takes on his sister-in-law as new wife, this is called sororat. 
32 Muchukiwa (2010, p…). Rapt refers to practices in some tribes whereby young men take a girl hostage for a number of days. After having had 
(forced) sexual intercourse the men negotiate a marriage. 
33 Muchukiwa (2010, p.13).
34 Rodgriguez (2007, p.4).
35 Pratt and Werchick (2004, p.8); Kelly (2010, p.3). 
36 Autesserre (2012, p.16).
37 Smits and Cruz (2011, p.2)
38 Interview UN-M-5
39 Interview UN-F-6
masculinities in conflict-affected areas’.40 During the interviews, it turned out that a growing, 
yet small number of NGOs and donors begin to focus on socio-cultural notions that 
underpin sexual and gender-based violence. These organizations distance themselves from 
re-actively responding to sexual violence and gradually shift instead towards preventive 
measures, addressing gender roles at the community level. A number of large donors have 
likewise become somewhat more flexible on budget-allocation for sexual violence assistance. 
‘We now begin to think that the perception of society towards women is the basis of violence 
against women. Whether it be acts committed by soldiers or civilians, it is rooted in the way 
they see women.’41 
40 Pratt and Werchick(2004, p.48).
41 Interview UN-M-5
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4
Statistics and the framing of sexual
violence
Since the first reports on sexual violence in the DRC triggered widespread attention, a wide 
range of institutions, organisations and independent researchers have attempted to capture 
the occurrence of sexual violence through statistical analysis, by estimating the number of 
cases identified over a certain period of time. Figure 1 presents a collection of figures in order 
to illustrate the large variety in numbers that circulate. This chapter will show that there is a 
large number of limitations and shortcomings in data collection, analysis and interpretation.
This leads to a situation where figures become contentious, considered by some as 
understatements and by others as overestimations. Even though some of the shortcomings 
in statistics have been documented for nearly a decade42, the figures continue to play an 
important a role. They are used by organisations to raise awareness, to prepare projects, to 
raise funds and to report on results of their interventions. Many figures find their way into 
the international media, where headlines give crude representations of the data, creating an 
image of Congo as ‘the worst place for women’43 and the ’rape capital of the world’44. The 
chapter presents arguments making the case for statistics to be used with the utmost care, 
and always complemented with qualitative and contextualised information.45
Period Source Location Number of cases
Since 1998 UN (estimated) Nationwide 200,000
2005-2007 (3 yrs) Malteser (reported) South Kivu 20,500
2007 Peterman et al (estimated) Nationwide 1.69 to 1.8 million women raped in 
their lifetime, over 400,000 in 2007
2008 UNFPA (reported) North Kivu 
Nationwide
4,820 
15,996 
2008 CPVS (reported) South Kivu 10,644
2008 UNFPA (reported) South Kivu 2,883
2009 MONUSCO (reported) North and 
South Kivu
15,000
2009 UNFPA (reported) Nationwide 17,507
Table 1: A collection of some data on sexual violence 46
42 See for example Pratt and Werchick (2004), albeit this study mostly refers to limits linked to the fact that victims don’t come forward or that 
some double figures are included.
43 Diverse media reports (2008).
44 These words were put forward by UN’s special representative on sexual violence Margareth Wallstrom. 
45 Interview UN-F-3
46 The figures that are estimates are based on survey data that have been extrapolated to the entire population. The reported figures originate 
from incidents collected by a variety of NGOs and UN agencies. The figures presented in the table have an informative function and should 
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4.1 Data collection on the basis of identified cases
Many data on sexual violence are based on extrapolations from registered cases. A major 
problem is that data-gathering is not coordinated properly. A variety of different organisations 
and state institutes collect and publish their own data. This is complicated by the fact that 
organisations are not transparent about their data. Many organisations are reluctant to share 
data in view of organisational competition, what respondents refer to as the ‘appropriation 
of victims’. This means that agencies do not want to give names of victims out of fear that 
other organisations will approach them to become their client. As a result, duplication of 
names in different data bases cannot be filtered out, which can be serious data bases of 
organisations include duplication as actors working in the same area tend to register the 
same beneficiaries. A number of informants also mentioned that many NGOs deliberately 
exaggerate figures for fundraising.47 ’It has become a championship; the one with the highest 
figures will receive most funding.’48 It has also been observed that women tend to register 
as victim of sexual violence with different organisations to increase their chance of being 
assisted. Capacities are lacking to generate reliable figures based on well-developed statistical 
approaches, and there is a lack of funding to properly supervise data gathering field visits 
where teams are supposed to verify and cross-check data provided by medical structures and 
NGOs.49 This casts doubt on the trustworthiness of figures.
Another problem concerns the geographical claims of statistics. Due to the inaccessibility 
of most areas, figures are usually drawn from a limited geographical area, but are often 
‘extrapolated’ to the wider population of a province. Most organisations argue that these 
figures should still be considered ‘a lower-bound approximation of the true situation 
in DRC’.50 Arguments to sustain this claim are that raped women tend not to report to 
NGOs or other data-collection structures. On the other hand, the extrapolated data could 
be overstatements. The argument to sustain that claim is that data-gathering is usually 
concentrated in areas that, on the basis of their conflict history, are known to experience high 
and grave incidents of sexual violence. 
Most data are not clearly explained, and statistics are often vague about the timeframe they 
use. As a result, old cases are mixed up with new ones. When the timeframe is not explicit, 
the narrative of the reports raises the suggestion that it talks about recent and ongoing 
practice. Most data fail to make a distinction between rape and other forms of sexual 
violence, as recognised in the law on sexual violence (see above, paragraph 3.3). 
Recent attempts to structure and coordinate data collection better and improve their 
quality, have resulted in higher estimates of incidents of sexual violence than were initially 
available. It has been recognised by respondents that this does not necessary reflect a factual 
increase, as awareness raising and the multiplication of data collection ‘spots’ has increased 
reporting.51 The impression remains, however, that sexual violence in DRC is continuously on 
the increase. One respondent stated: ‘There has not been a single year where figures were 
by no means be interpreted as correct or ‘most reliable’. 
47 Interview CNGO-M-3
48 Interview CNGO-M-2
49 Interview GOV-M-1
50 Peterman et al (2011, p.1066).
51 Interview GOV-M-1.
down. How can this be, with all the mechanisms to combat sexual violence’?52
According to some respondents, the problems identified regarding statistics are partly due 
to the ‘fixation on statistics’ of (international) donors seeking to quantify projects in terms of 
the number of cases identified, the number of cases treated, the number of cases prosecuted, 
etc. This pressure leads to flawed, inconsistent and incorrect data, as it ‘pushes people to lie, 
whether on the side of NGOs or beneficiaries’.53
4.2   Data on the basis of population statistics 
In order to come up with more reliable data on the occurrence of sexual violence, there have 
recently been a number of research projects that seek to map statistically the occurrence and 
characteristics of sexual violence in the DRC.
A recent study published in June 2011 in the American Journal of Public Health concludes 
that 48 women are raped in Congo every hour.54 The study asked women about their history 
of rape, rape in the last 12 months, and intimate partner sexual violence. The study consisted 
of a household-survey sample of 3,436 women between 15 and 49 years from all 11 provinces, 
with data gathered in 2006 and 2007. The sample has been drawn from a larger sample 
(9,995 women) of the DRC Demographic Health Survey.
The study provoked a lot of debate in DRC. Several critics question the reliability of the 
extrapolation, especially since the population data bases that were used are outdated and 
allegedly lack accuracy. The survey is also thought to be hampered by the lack of detail 
on local factors that influence intimate partner violence and rape that differ widely within 
provinces. The research has also resulted in confusion over types of sexual violence. The 
study asks about the history of rape (‘Has anyone ever forced you to have sexual relations 
with them against your will’?) as well as intimate partner sexual violence (‘Has your partner 
ever physically forced you to have sex or perform sexual acts against your will’?). Although 
the law considers both acts as sexual crimes, the label of ‘rape’ is customarily reserved for 
sexual violence outside the marriage or partnership. The conclusion of ‘48 women raped 
per hour’ has by the international media been framed in relation to conflict, reinforcing 
the previously attributed label of Congo being the centre of rape as a weapon of war. The 
important conclusion of the study that calls attention to domestic violence and marital rape 
as the most prevalent type of sexual violence in the country, in conflict-affected as well as 
non-conflict-affected provinces, has mainly been lost. 
Another widely cited source that studies the characteristics of sexual violence in DRC is 
the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative. One of their studies (2009)55 constitutes a statistical 
analysis of a survey of 255 women that have reported for medical assistance after sexual 
violence at the Panzi Hospital and two field sites in Chambucha and Bunyakiri. Chambucha 
and Bunyakiriare are situated within or nearby FDLR strongholds, known for grave assaults 
and a high incidence of abduction. The study found that women that participated in the 
52 Interview UN-M-4
53 Interview CNGO-F-2
54 Peterman et al. (2011).
55 Harvard Humanitarian Initiative (2009).
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survey were on average assaulted by 2.83 attackers, 69% experienced gang rape and 46% had 
been abducted. Although the study is clear about the fact that it studied a sub-population of 
sexually violated women that sought medical aid and were thus probably the most severely 
affected victims, the figures have been widely cited to represent rape cases in DRC more 
generally. The data were gathered in 2008, but the study does not give a time reference to 
when the crimes occurred. As a result, many people citing the study treat the information as 
currently occurring. 
Similar problems appear in other studies. A study statistically analysing the 2006 medical 
records of Panzi Hospital on criteria such as victims’ demographics, patterns of the assault, 
and consequences for the victim, does not specify where and when assaults took place and 
nonetheless draws conclusions for the entire South Kivu province.56
As a result of these studies, worst cases are seen as typical cases and, because of the 
unspecified timeframes of the assault, trends in the occurrence of sexual violence remain 
hidden. The image of predominantly war-related crimes gets frozen in time.
4.3   International visits and media
Apart from the studies referred to above, the international perception in media and among 
policy maker of sexual violence in DRC is strongly influenced by the points of view of a 
limited number of Congolese activists and experts. They meet international visitors to the 
DRC and are often invited to international events as key-note speakers. Examples are Dr 
Denis Mukwege, a medical doctor known for treating fistulas at Panzi Hospital Bukavu, Mrs 
Justine Masika, winner of the Dutch human rights tulip and Executive Secretary of Synergie 
des Femmes Contre les Violences Sexuelles, Chouchou Namegabe, journalist and coordinator 
of Association des Femmes des Médias, and Colonel Honorine Munyole, Police Officer for the 
Protection of Women and Children. Mrs Masika acknowledges that the Congolese experts 
and activists themselves have, for a long time, relied on a simplified victim-based narrative 
on sexual violence rather than bringing about a strategic discussion on how to eradicate its 
root causes. At the same time she blames international actors for only wanting to hear part 
of the story. ‘Quite often they alter my interventions because they want information to fit into 
the theoretical framework they already had.’
International delegations usually visit a limited number of places. Most go to Panzi 
Hospital (Bukavu) or Heal Africa (Goma), both conveniently located in urban centres. What 
delegations get to see in those hospitals could be qualified as the most extreme sexual 
violence cases where women suffer from extensive physical damage. Interviews are arranged 
with victims. The women available for interviews usually consist of the same women who 
have been connected to the hospitals for years and hence relate the stories that happened to 
them years ago. Whereas these cases represent part of reality, this reinforces the impression 
that sexual violence crimes in Congo are all very brutal in nature and it blurs the timeframe in 
which these cases should be understood. Because the encounter is shocking, a respondent 
states that ‘visitors find it inappropriate to ask fundamental and strategic questions about 
56 Bartels et al (2010).
sexual violence and the assistance offered.’57 And, as another claims, ’immediately following 
such visits, funding for sexual violence begins to fall down like rain showers’.58 Here, 
reference can be made to the 2010 visit of the US Minister of Foreign Affairs Hillary Clinton, 
after which USD 17 million was allocated to the International Rescue Committee, Heal Africa 
and Panzi.
4.4   Reacting to statistics
Many respondents to our study reacted strongly to the situation regarding quantifying sexual 
violence. They feel that the ‘numbers game’ distracts attention from the real problem, which 
is to understand why sexual violence occurs and how it can effectively be dealt with. ‘What 
is the point in knowing whether there are 100,000 or even 1.8 million women raped? What 
counts is whether help is available and satisfactory - even if it would just be for one woman’.59 
Nonetheless, it is worthwhile to keep investing in improved data collection, analysis, 
presentation and information sharing because it is the only way in which needs can be 
correctly matched with the resources available. 
Congolese respondents find it particularly disturbing that the crude figures that reach 
the international media largely determine how sexual violence in DRC is perceived and 
stereotyped, constantly highlighting the massive occurrence of the most brutal (war-related) 
rape crimes. They refer to the resulting negative image of Congo, the simplified reality 
around sexual violence, and the ‘truthification’ of doubtful figures. A number of respondents 
mentioned that figures are rarely comparative, putting DRC on the spot, while other countries 
may have similar or higher rape incidents, such as, for example, South Africa.60 Some 
respondents even suggested that the ‘mediatisation’ of the problem, has raised the curiosity 
of men who start to believe that they can also impose themselves on girls and women.61
The gravity of sexual violence in DRC, has led to an over-emphasis on statistics regarding 
its prevalence. Although there are plausible arguments that statistics underestimate the 
prevalence of sexual violence, because of taboos around reporting such violence, there are 
also trends that lead to overestimation of figures. The collection of data is intertwined with 
organisational politics because international funding of programmes is often linked to data 
produced and organisational competition prohibits data sharing. In the process, an image 
is created that all figures refer to cases of brutal (war-related) rape. As a result, the way the 
statistics have come to dominate discussions stands in the way of a meaningful dialogue 
involving Congolese and international actors aimed at analysing the problems and finding 
effective ways to address them. 
57 Interview CNGO-M-1
58 Interview UN-M-4 
59 Interview CNGO-F-2
60 Interview CNGO-F-6
61 Interview UN-M-4
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Actors, funding and coordination
The increase in attention to sexual violence has attracted a large and, over the years, 
increasing number of organisations that have developed and implemented projects to assist 
sexual violence survivors in DRC, representing large flows of funding. The type of actors and 
funding for programmes against sexual violence that characterises the intervention domain 
are described in this chapter. It particularly addresses problems linked to coordination and to 
the over-prioritisation of sexual violence in relation to other development challenges.
5.1   Actors involved in sexual violence assistance
Over the years, the number of organisations that work on sexual violence has grown 
exponentially, especially in North and South Kivu provinces. It is impossible to say how many 
organisations it encompasses exactly as registration mechanisms (the responsibility of the 
Ministry of Planning) are poorly developed. It is estimated that in each of those provinces it 
may currently add up to 300-400 organisations. It must be noted that this includes Congolese 
NGOs, international NGOs, and UN agencies, as well as a large number of small community-
based organisations in rural areas.
Until 2002, a very small number of mostly Congolese human rights organisations raised 
awareness on sexual violence as a war crime. Most active organisations gathered into some 
form of coalition, but their numbers remained small, in South Kivu for example, less than 
10. Between 2002 and 2004 international organisations increasingly came to Congo, also 
influenced by the official end of the war. Most followed an approach whereby sub-grants 
were to be handed over to local organisations, an approach further strengthened by the 
establishment of the 2006 Pooled Fund, where humanitarian donors pooled funds to respond 
to the yearly humanitarian needs assessment.62 When increasing reports of sexual violence 
came out, this led to a sharp increase in funding that was especially earmarked for assistance 
to survivors of sexual violence and the combat of impunity. An increasing number of the 
established Congolese but also international NGOs added sexual violence to their main 
intervention strategies.63 A number of new NGOs were also founded with the particular aim 
to work on sexual violence, or as a respondent formulated this, to ‘pitch in the sexual violence 
market’.64 Many of those organisations are seen as opportunists. ‘They have never had a 
vocation for women’s rights but walk around with posters and billboards as if they do.’65
62 The Pooled Fund is a humanitarian basket-fund to which most of the large bilateral donors contribute. The often multi-million projects are, 
under different thematic fields, implemented by lead UN agencies that sub contract local NGOs on the basis of short-term projects (often not 
surpassing six months in terms of duration). 
63 Interview UN-M-3
64 Interview CNGO-M-1
65 Interview CNGO-F-1
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) Netherlands: ICCO / CORDAID / MensenMet eenMissie / StichtingVluchteling / Oxfam Novib/ ZOA refugee 
care / Warchild / United States of America: IRC / Eastern Congo Initiative / V-day / Hope in Action / AVSI 
/ IMC / SFCG / American Bar Association / Human Rights Watch / Women for Women /United Kingdom: 
Oxfam-UK / Merlin / Save the Children / Tearfund (Ireland) / SCIAF (Scotland) / Avocats Sans Frontières 
(Belgium) / Oxfam-Quebec (Canada) / VSF-Suisse (Switzerland) / COOPI (Italy) / Oxfam Solidarité (Spain) 
/ AMI (France) / Fin Church Aid (Finland) / Norwegian Church Aid (Norway) / Norwegian Refugee Council 
(Norway) / Médicins du Monde (multiple) / Médicins Sans Frontières (multiple) / CICR (multiple) / CARE 
(multiple)
UN UNIFEM-UNWOMEN / UNDP / MONUSCO-JHRO / UNHCR / UNFPA / UNICEF / UN OCHA
C
on
go
le
se
 N
G
O
s 
(3
7)
Caritas Congo / Centre de Recherche sur l’Environnement la Démocratie et les Droits de l’Homme, 
CREDDHO / Arche d’Alliance / Caucus de Femmes / Caritas / Commission Diocésaine Justice et Paix, 
CDJP / Cadre Permanent de Concertation de la Femme Congolaise, CAFCO / Dynamique des Femmes 
Juristes, DFJ / Synergie des Femmes pour les Violences Sexuelles, SFVS / Action Sociale pour la Paix et le 
Développement, ASPD / Synergie de l’Assistance Juridique, SAJ / Heal Africa / Fondation Femme Plus / 
Panzi Hospital, Panzi Foundation / Réseau des Femmes pour le Développement et la Paix, RFDP / Centre 
Olame / Association des Femmes de Médias, AFEM / Bureau pour le Volontariat au Service de l’Enfance, 
BVES / Conseil des Organisations des Femmes Agissant en Synergie, COFAS / Laissez l’Afrique Vivre, 
LAV / Village de Cobaille, VICO / Action Communautaire pour la Défense et le Progrès des Agriculteurs, 
ACODEPA / Action pour la Promotion et la Défense des Droits des Personne Défavorisés, APRODEPED / 
Association des Femmes Juristes au Congo, AFEJUCO / Réseau Vision Myriam / Œuvre Communautaire 
pour l’Education de Tous, OCET / Pole Institute / Collectif des Organisations de Jeunes, COJESKI / Centre 
d’Assistance Médico Psychosociale, CAMPS / Solidarité Paysanne / Service d’Accompagnement et de 
Renforcement des Capacités d’Auto Promotion de la Femme au Sud-Kivu, SARCAF / Héritiers de la Justice 
/ Solidarité des Femmes de Fizi pour le Bien Être Familial, SOFIBEF / Réseau des Activistes des Droits 
Humaines de Fizi, RADHF / Action Contre l’Abolition de la Torture, ACAT / Solidarité pour la Promotion 
sociale et la Paix, SOPROP / Observatoire Congolaise des Prisons, OCP 
Table 2: Organisations working on sexual violence in North and South Kivu that are known to the authors66
Next to the NGOs, quite a number of government agencies have responsibility to combat 
sexual violence, amongst them the Ministry of Gender, the justice sector and special military 
and police sections. It should be mentioned here that there is a gap in mutual appreciation 
and collaboration between the NGOs and state actors. Most NGOs claim that government 
officials are not putting in enough effort and lack capacities and willingness. They claim that 
government officials stay away from joint meetings and don’t follow-up on their promises. 
‘They have no clue about what is happening; not a single Minister is on top of the sexual 
violence problem’.67 And according to another observer, ’without financial support there is 
hardly engagement, we have to push them.’68 When asked their point of view, government 
officials draw a different picture and blame NGOs for deliberately excluding them; they 
believe that NGOs have an established conviction that the state is incapable and NGOs 
want to ’share the cake amongst themselves’.69 The lack of access to funds on behalf of 
state actors is caused by the weak execution of Congo’s state budget (reserved funds are 
unrealistic and rarely arrive) and also the reluctance of INGOs to reserve budget lines for 
state functioning either because of fear of corruption or because their mandates often 
explicitly bar the possibility of directly supporting the state. 
66 Many of the organizations have offices in both provinces, as well as smaller field-based offices/representatives, or collaborate with a wide 
variety of community-based organizations. Those are not mentioned in the table. 
67 Interview INGO-F-2
68 Interview UN-M-4
69 Interview GOV-M-1; interview GOV-F-2
Nearly all organisations aim to align their activities with the Congo’s governmental national 
strategy against sexual violence. The National Strategy is operationalised under the STAREC 
programme. This government programme for stabilising eastern DRC focuses on three 
domains: security, humanitarian and social assistance, and economic development. The 
STAREC plan is supported by the international community under the international support 
strategy (ISSSS). The costs of the programme are estimated at USD 1,204 million, of which 
a third has been committed (USD 416 million) next to USD 788 million that still needs to be 
raised.70 Sexual violence is a cross-cutting issue and five pillars of intervention in relation to 
sexual violence are specified. These pillars are considered to be interdependent, and should 
be approached in a multi-sectoral and holistic way. They are chaired by different UN agencies: 
the fight against impunity (JHRO-MONUSCO71, and UNDP access to justice programme), 
protection and prevention (UNHCR), Security Sector Reform (UN gender office and 
MONUSCO DSS), multi-sectoral assistance (UNICEF) and data and mapping (UNFPA).
5.2   Available funding
A central database on funding for programmes against sexual violence is lacking, but it 
is clear that budgets for sexual violence assistance are quite significant. Sexual violence 
assistance funding is largely directed by two Multi Donor Trust Funds (MDTF). The first 
concerns the Stabilization and Recovery Funding Facility (SRFF, 2009) in support of the UN 
International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy (ISSSS), which operates in line with 
STAREC. Until March 2012, Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden have contributed 
to SRFF, adding up to a total budget of USD 16.7 million (of USD 22.8 million pledged). Of 
this amount, USD 14.3 million has so far been allocated, of which USD 10.4 million allocated 
to the sexual violence pillar of the strategy.72 Under the second funding modality (Pooled 
Fund), in 2010 alone, USD 2.2 million was allocated to sexual violence assistance.73 It was 
originally decided in 2009 to exclude sexual violence programmes from this Fund as it was 
brought under the mandate of SRFF. However, as different organisations argued that sexual 
violence continues to require humanitarian interventions, funding became possible. Next to 
this, there are a number of bilateral funding modalities, of which some of the most important 
are incorporated in the scheme below. As Table 3 shows, the total adds up to USD 86.4 
million available for sexual violence from 2010 onwards with an average project timetable 
of just under 3 years.74 The Table does not include budgets that have been allocated to 
sexual violence prior to 2010, grants that flow directly to Congolese NGOs from a variety of 
international organisations, and a variety of other international funding schemes, including 
the World Bank. The actual budgets for sexual violence assistance are thus higher than 
presented here. How the amounts of sexual violence-labelled funds relate to actual needs 
falls outside the scope of this research. 
70 Custers (2009, p.1), see also: www.amanileo.net
71 The Joint Human Rights Office is a combined effort of MONUSCO-Human Rights and the UN-Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights (OHCHR)
72 Based on spending until early March 2012, source: Multi-Partner Trustfund, http://mdtf.undp.org.
73 Smits and Cruz (2011).
74 The Table takes 2010 as starting year because from that year onwards sexual violence funding became ‘visibly’ earmarked under the SRFF 
funding modality. Most of those programmes are still ongoing and provide thus picture of the present-day reality of available funds.
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Donor Funds Funding 
period
# years Operational 
partners
Location Focus of projects 
SRFF 10,441,088 USD 2010 - 
march 2012
2.2 UNOPS, 
UNHCR, 
UNESCO, 
OHCHR, 
UNFPA
SK, IT Impunity, protection 
and prevention, 
FARDC, services to 
victims, data mapping 
(2010-2011)
Pooled 
Fund
2,200,000 USD 2010 1 UN agencies Mostly east 2010 alone
USAID 24,524,000 USD 2011-2015 5 IMC2, ABA, 
COOPI
NK, SK, IT, 
MN
Promoting 
reintegration, 
behaviour change, 
care, empowerment, 
psychological support 
USAID 7,676,000 USD 2011-2015 5 IMA, Heal 
Africa, Panzi
NK, SK, IT, 
MN
RNE 9,000,000 USD 2010-2012 3 Heal Africa, 
ABA
MN Access to justice
SIDA 1,563,506 USD 2010-2011 2 UNDP NK, SK Socio-economic 
integration
SIDA 3,200,000 USD 2009-2010 2 REJUSCO, 
UNDP
NK, SK Justice reform, 
training, case-
assistance, justice 
infrastructure
BDLR 695,000 USD 2011 1 UNDP NK, SK
EU3 8,761,241 USD 2010-2011
2010-2013
2-4 SCIAF, 
COOPI, Heal 
Africa, AMI
NK, SK
DFID 1,300,000 USD 2011-2013 3 National Ministry of Gender 
capacity building
US (Hillary 
Clinton 
visit)
17,000,000 USD ? ? IRC4, 
Engender 
Health, others
Medical training, 
police training, 
assistance to victims
Total 86.4 million USD
Table 3: Funding schemes for sexual violence, mainly from 2010 onwards 75/76/77/78/79
Many respondents in the DRC are critical of what they perceive as an over-emphasis of sexual 
violence at the expense of other urgent needs in the country. Although a full comparison 
of funding flows to different sectors is beyond the scope of our research, Table 4 is meant 
to illustrate the proportion of funds for sexual violence compared to other sectors under a 
number of different Multi Donor Trust Funds, based on approved projects between January 
75  NK=North Kivu; SK=South Kivu; IT=Ituri; MN=Maniema 
76 IMC is the main grantee with USD 10 million.
77 This amount, representing 6,637,304 EURO, originates from the 10th EU Development Fund. With a total budget of EUR 561.7 for the period 
2008-2013 it is most likely that other parts of this funding modality are also allocated towards sexual violence. The rough thematic division 
of the 10th EU Development Fund:governance EUR 130 million, infrastructure EUR 251 million, health EUR 51 million, environment EUR 29 
million and other themes (ex. emergency aid, agriculture, food security and regional initiatives) EUR 100.6 million. Source: European Com-
mission (2008, p.12).
78 IRC is the main grantee with USD 7 million.
79 Sources: MONUSCO-Sexual Violence Unit (internal), Smits and Cruz (2011), Multi-Partner Trustfund (http://mdtf.undp.org/factsheet), 
individual donor information.
2010 and December 2011 onwards80. As Table 4 shows, healthcare spending under the 
Pooled Fund is just 30% higher than sexual violence funding under SSRF. Also, the sexual 
violence budget is nearly double the size of the budget for all security sector reform activities 
(SSR trust fund), and just under half the size of the entire peace building trust fund, which 
are arguably two themes geared towards prevention of sexual violence. 
MDTF5 Themes, focus Approved 
2010-2011
million USD
% 
total
SRFF-SV 
proportion 
SRFF
2010-2012
Sexual violence 8.14 3.43 1
IDPs 3.95 1.66 0.5
SSR
2008-2011
Non-lethal support to FARDC, military justice 
(training and rehabilitation of infrastructures), 
living conditions of military personnel (ex. 
building barracks)
5.33 2.24 0.6
Peacebuilding 
2006-2015
Returnees, DDR, police reform and training, 
restoration of state authority through training 
and infrastructure rehabilitation, military justice, 
prison conditions, human rights 
17.94 7.55 2.2
Pooled Fund
2006-2012
Coordination, early recovery, education, food 
security, health, logistics, refugees, nutrition, 
protection, shelter and non-food item, water-
sanitation and hygiene
195.42 82.23 n/a
…of which 6 Water, sanitation and hygiene 16.83 7.08 2.0
Education 4.83 2.03 0.6
Health 10.46 4.40 1.3
Food security 11.87 4.99 1.3
Nutrition 6.39 2.69 0.8
Protection 7.15 3.00 0.9
MDG
2007-2012
Economic reintegration of returnees and victims 
of sexual violence, improving basic social 
services on community level
1.37 0.58 0.2
UN-REDD
2008-2012
Deforestation, nature conservation 5.50 2.31 0.7
Total 237.65 100%
Table 4: Multi trust fund modalities for DRC, approved projects between 2010 and 2011 (24 months)81/82/83
80 Since table 3 deals with projects from 2010 onwards and the SRFF under which most sexual violence assistance is now earmarked came in 
effect in November 2009, the other multi donor trust fund budgets have also been calculated from 2010 onwards to make comparison more 
accurate.
81 The timeframe is based on years for which charts on budget data are available on the MDTF website.
82 In line with the degree of detail provided by the database on the Multi Partner Trustfund website some of the thematic areas of spending of 
the Pooled Fund are clarified here. The remaining (biggest share) of the Pooled Fund budget is not thematically labeled and referred to as 
‘Pooled Fund’ and ‘Managing Agent/NGOs’, and is not included as sub-spending in table 4.
83 Sources: MONUSCO-Sexual Violence Unit (internal), Smits and Cruz (2011), Multi-Partner Trustfund (http://mdtf.undp.org/factsheet), 
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It is also interesting to compare international donor budgets for sexual violence with the 
budget reserved by the Congolese state for the theme, referred to by respondents as ‘quasi-
non-existing’.84 The implementation and coordination of the National Strategy on Sexual 
Violence is primarily the responsibility of the Ministry of Gender. The Congolese state budget 
for 2011 shows a budget of FC 7,171,815,88 (or USD 7.9 million) for the Ministry of Gender, 
0.1% of the total state budget. Of this amount, only USD 3.24 million (or 40.7%) was paid 
out up to the 31st of October 2011. Roughly three quarters went to the administration of the 
Ministry and only USD 838,000 to a variety of services and funds that are to ensure research 
on the status of women and to plan and coordinate sexual violence interventions.85
The great disparity in the availability of funds to the Ministry of Gender compared to the 
budgets of multi-million dollar donor projects indicates that international programmes are 
dominant in shaping the response to sexual violence. The largest share of management and 
strategy definition is in the hands of the donor. Local implementing agencies are rarely given 
the responsibility for the budgets as they are considered lacking in management capacities 
and transparent accountability. ‘They say we don’t have the capacities to manage large sums 
of money and therefore funds are directed towards international actors. But how can we work 
without funds? It’s a new form of colonisation.’86
5.3   Coordination of initiatives
In the early days of attention to sexual violence in Congo, a number of Congolese NGOs had 
their own coordination mechanism. Sometime later, the Congolese government launched the 
CPLVS (Comité Provincial de Lutte Contre les Violences Sexuelles) under the Initiative Conjointe 
(2003). The CPLVS was a mechanism chaired by the Ministry of Gender and gathered 
mostly Congolese organisations, as well as some international NGOs. As the structure was 
also present at territory level (CTLVS), it was in theory possible to achieve a rather detailed 
account of existing initiatives and how they could be complementary. However, the CPLVS 
started at a time that competition over funds was high and was soon hampered by conflicts 
over leadership. Participant organisations were reluctant to share relevant information, 
especially regarding the identification of victims (and hence numbers to be presented in their 
projects and towards their donors). Due to these problems, CPLVS ceased to be operational. 
As this happened at the same time as the increased funding of large UN-led projects that 
fall under the STAREC programme, the ISSSS strategy and the National Strategy on Sexual 
Violence, UN agencies created a new multi-sectoral coordination system led by UNICEF. 
Each of the five pillars of the National Strategy has a working group that involves state actors, 
local and international NGOs and UN agencies. Most working group meetings centre on 
information sharing: ‘who does what and where’. Debate on more strategic perceptions 
and possible reorientation of programming hardly occurs, because ‘there is no time’.87 
individual donor information. NK=North Kivu; SK=South Kivu; IT=Ituri; MN=Maniema. The MDTF for microfinance has been left out of the 
comparison, since it was the only MDTF for which approved budgets covered a 12 month period from 2011-2012. This made comparison with 
the other MDTFs difficult.
84 Interview UN-M-3
85 Ministry of Budget (2011). 
86 Interview CNGO-F-2
87 Interview UN-M-4
Once a year, however, a strategic review is organised to analyse what has been done and 
to prioritise and budget for new programmes.88 A large number of local NGOs and smaller 
international NGOs do not find those meetings very effective, mostly because of the lack of 
in-depth debate. ‘Everyone just wants to show they do more than the others.’89 Also, there 
exists a general feeling that the viewpoints of small players and government agencies are 
little heard, or overruled. Some local NGOs and state agents that were interviewed for this 
report stopped participating in the meetings for these reasons.90 Next to those coordination 
schemes, a lot of organisations sub-coordinate on the basis of programmes funded by 
a specific donor, often on request of the donor. ‘There are many sub-committees. These 
operate like a club of friends that meet each other and refer sexual violence cases to each 
other.’91
This chapter, in conclusion, has described the complex web of funding, actor and 
coordination mechanisms concerning sexual violence in the DRC. Without a clear needs 
analysis, it is difficult to assess whether available funds are high or low. In comparison with 
other sectors, the attention to sexual violence is high which leads to frequent comments that 
the attention to sexual violence by the international community leads to the neglect of other 
problems. The large number of actors engaged in sexual violence response, highly dominated 
by international actors compared to the involvement of the DRC government, highlights the 
complexity and challenges of coordination. 
88 Interview UN-F-1 
89 Interview GOV-F-2
90 Interview CNGO-F-1
91 Interview INGO-F-3
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6
Types and characteristics of assistance
The type of sexual violence assistance programmes evolved through time according to the 
understanding of the problem and available funds. This chapter looks into the different types 
of assistance. It argues that the single focus on the direct assistance to victims impedes 
a preventive strategy to tackle the root causes of sexual violence. The targeting of services 
for sexual violence leads to reproductive health problems that are being treated under the 
mandate of services for sexual violence victims being overlooked. 
6.1   A holistic approach covering multiple sectors
When the number of agencies started to grow after 2002, a consensus emerged that a 
holistic approach, also referred to as a multi-sector approach, would be most effective which 
means the combination of medical, psycho-social, economic, and judicial assistance to 
survivors of sexual violence.92 In addition, there have been cross-cutting efforts in the field of 
sensitisation and awareness raising, and some security-related preventive measures.
•	 Medical assistance concerns the physical rehabilitation of rape-related body-trauma, 
in particular fistulas. Fistula is a medical condition in which the tissue separating 
the vagina from the anus is torn resulting in incontinence, infections and infertility. 
Although normally associated with child-birth, it may occur through extreme violence 
during rape, such as during gang rape and the insertion of objects into a woman’s 
vagina. Also, in recent years a lot of programmes have focused on PEP-kit treatment 
within 72hrs after the attack to avoid the transmission of sexually transmitted diseases 
(STDs) and HIV.
•	 Psycho-social assistance is mainly focused on the detraumatisation of the victim, whereby 
priority is given to ‘écoute’’ (listening), quite often in a temporary shelter setting 
created for rape victims (maisons d’écoute). Sessions are mostly led by trained psycho-
social workers (psychologists are rare in Congo), individually or in group settings. A 
lot of programmes have also focused on psychological aid to family and community 
members to reduce rejection and stigmatisation (mediation).
•	 Economic assistance offers rape victims the opportunity to reintegrate into their 
societies. This ranges from the mere distribution of a kit (usually including kitchen 
utensils, some food, agricultural working tools, and clothing) to skill based training 
(Sewing, for example) and agricultural credits for productive activities (for example 
seeds, goats, rabbits). Many programmes form groups of women, sometimes mixed 
92 Pratt and Werchick (2004, p.6)
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with other vulnerable people from their communities, with the aim of strengthening 
the social fabric through joint projects, such as a rotating credit scheme.
•	 Judicial assistance is mostly geared towards the prosecution of rape perpetrators, 
whereby organisations support the victim in filing a complaint, and pay the process 
costs and a lawyer. This form of assistance has received increasing attention in recent 
years. It focuses on civilian rape cases as the soldiers that raped during wartime are 
difficult to identify. Judicial assistance is also offered to justice experts (for example 
lawyers, judges) in the form of training or financial support for organising trials, 
especially in rural areas, and the purchase of office equipment, as well as the payment 
of logistical costs of organising mobile courts (often including per diems or ‘primes’ for 
judges).
•	 Community sensitisation has been largely focused on raising awareness on the content 
of the law on sexual violence, to signal that sexual violence does not go unpunished. 
A lot of sensitisation also focused on the ‘acceptance’ of victims, with the aim of 
reducing stigma and rejection.
•	 Security and justice sector reform concerns activities that address structural security and 
impunity problems linked to sexual violence. For example, army reform programmes 
address sexual violence as a crosscutting concern to be included in the training of 
soldiers and the police. Political processes have also been supported, for example 
in drafting the national plan to fight sexual violence and putting in place of special 
sexual violence taskforces in a number of ministerial departments (for example Justice, 
Defence, Gender). 
Holistic programming assumes a follow-through of the different steps and a coordinated 
cross-referral between organisations with specific expertise in either of the domains. 
However, in reality many organisations refrain from referral and attempt to offer all types of 
assistance themselves, even though they may not have the all-round expertise this requires. 
Many organisations only refer to colleagues that work with funding from the same donor: 
this is often stipulated by the donor to enhance their control over the entire process. 
The holistic approach and referral system often stops short of judicial care. This can be 
illustrated with figures from UNICEF over the first 6 months of 2011: out of 7,157 reported 
cases, 6,433 received psychosocial and economic assistance, 4,289 received medical 
assistance and 495 cases were followed up judicially.93 Apart from the difficulty of identifying 
perpetrators, many women are not interested in judicial care, either because they don’t trust 
the system, or because they prioritise the other types of service.94 ‘A lot of victims disappear 
once we start talking justice, simply because their expectations were related to the medical 
and economic field’.95
93 Interview UN-M-4. ‘Followed up judicially’ merely refers to the case being reported. It does not reflect a conclusion of the case. 
94 Interview GOV-M-6
95 Interview CNGO-M-1
6.2   Victim-oriented relief at the expense of a broader strategy
The largest share of budgets has gone to the immediate assistance of women that are 
victims of rape. Only a few organisations focus on male victims or on perpetrators. They feel 
that working with men is seen by the international community and also Congolese society 
as some sort of moral betrayal and does not easily fit into mandates.96 ‘We are indirectly 
pushed to choose sides, which is largely linked to what is dictated by those that support our 
programmes’.97
A number of respondents question the focus on individual victims at the expense of 
community-based approaches to sexual violence assistance. For example, under psycho-
social and economic reintegration approaches, the installation of ‘maisons d’écoute’ or 
transition shelters for victims, is considered to reinforce stigmatisation. This approach 
is followed by a lot of local organisations. Sexual violence victims are for a period of time 
taken away from their communities and return with new skills and goods handed to them 
in the form of reintegration kits. This reinforces jealousy in overall poor and vulnerable 
communities. The fact that communities that experienced violent attacks, including 
sexual violence, are traumatised as a whole is overlooked and especially psycho-social 
and economic reintegration programmes should, in the eyes of a number of respondents, 
cater for a more inclusive, broader and development-based approach stepping away from 
humanitarian victim-relief.
Medical assistance programmes focus on health problems that are directly related to sexual 
assault (for example fistulas98, HIV-infection). Although this seems reasonable from a project 
point of view, it raises two problems. First, the programmes cannot assist victims of sexual 
violence with other health problems, including longer-term side-effects (for example infertility 
problems) or problems that were left untreated because of the psychological condition and/
or weak financial situation of the victim. Secondly, the services are not available to women 
suffering from similar problems as a result of child-birth or consensual sexual relationships. 
As there are few reproductive health facilities, these patients are rejected or they are treated 
‘clandestinely’, with the possibility of being included in rape-statistics.
The lack of funding for non-sexual violence activities is also observed in other domains and 
poses problems, as stated by a woman activist: ‘Our projects on female political leadership 
are rejected because donors say they don’t have funds for it. But how can we then ensure that 
women survive in this country? Everyone only looks at the consequences.’99
Awareness raising has mainly focused on explaining the content of the law on sexual 
violence and the different forms of sexual violence it includes, and the problems observed 
with stigmatisation and rejection of victims. Most of the awareness raising is done through 
posters and leaflets with the law’s content (often through cartoons or pictures) or radio 
emissions. Nearly all organisations communicate variations of two messages: ‘rape is illegal 
96 Interview CNGO-F-3, interview CNGO-M-3
97 Interview CNGO-M-2
98 A fistula is a health condition that happens when the wall between a woman’s vagina and the bladder and/or rectum tears. This can be caused 
by rape-related trauma but is also a common consequence of child-birth, especially in situations where women lack adequate reproductive 
healthcare. Fistula’s generally cause serious incontinence problems and may result in life-threatening infections.
99 Interview CNGO-F-5
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and punishable by law’ and ‘rape is never the fault of the victim, she needs support’. A 
number of respondents are of the opinion that awareness-raising focuses too much on the 
law, without talking about socio-cultural causes of sexual violence. ‘We focus on the legal 
aspects while the problem is social’.100They find this especially problematic because they 
think that the legal threats are not effective in creating a ‘fear-factor’, because the population 
anticipates that the justice system is unlikely to work, given their experiences with the 
functioning and corruption of the government. 
When talking to medical experts and NGO representatives, it appears that today nearly 
all of the fistulas being treated in Congo’s most renowned hospitals (Panzi and Heal 
Africa) are linked to child-birth rather than rape. Since early 2011, the provincial health 
inspection (IPS) demands more detail on the cause of reported fistulas (rape-related 
or pregnancy-related). Since then, Heal Africa reports that less than 3% of its fistula 
operations have a link with sexual violence.101 A surgeon of the Panzi Hospital affirms 
that in 2011 only 1 out of over 350 fistula operations was reportedly the immediate 
consequence of rape.102 The medical inspector of IPS, himself a surgeon, acknowledges 
that he uses sexual violence funds for pregnancy-related fistula operations. ‘What 
should I do, it hurts me to see that those women suffer, sometimes already for over 20 
years. Should I send them away because they were not raped?’103                                                                
Box 1: Fistula operations: rape or child birth
6.3   Humanitarian approach to sexual violence
A number of the problems identified above are related to what respondents perceive as the 
humanitarian approach to sexual violence. As sexual violence is strongly associated with the 
war, it is dealt with as part of the humanitarian crisis. The policy and funding instruments for 
sexual violence are thus rooted in ‘humanitarian relief, security interventions, early recovery 
activities and small-scale state building’.104 One outcome of this is that the funds available to 
combat sexual violence are predominately oriented towards the war-affected areas in eastern 
Congo.105 Although everybody agrees that an effective answer to sexual violence requires 
political and judicial reforms, the overwhelming tendency in the interventions is towards 
curative measures, which is consistent with the humanitarian approach which is to aid 
vulnerable people rather than to aim for institution strengthening.
Other problems associated with the humanitarian approach is the short time-span of 
funding, usually six months to one year, the lack of follow-up and quality monitoring, and 
weak learning capacity across the sector. For example, a recent multi-donor evaluation 
showed that economic reintegration of demobilised ex-combatants (for example under the 
100 Interview CNGO-M-1
101 Interview GOV-M-1
102 Interview CNGO-F-4. This concerns fistula operations that have been conducted under the project ‘medical and psycho-social assistance to 
survivors of sexual violence and women in need of specialized gynecological care in Eastern DR Congo’.
103 Interview GOV-M-1
104 Smits and Cruz (2011, p.2). 
105 Smits and Cruz (2011, p.2)
CONADER/PNDDR programmes) failed to include community members that were not 
carrying arms and were limited in offering sustainable reintegration.106 Nonetheless, sexual 
violence programmes largely continue to build on approaches that are in a similar way 
non-community-based. In a similar vein, it has been recognised that singular attention to 
HIV-AIDS in the long run led to deterioration of general health services. But we now observe 
similar side-effects in the case of sexual violence.
Many organisations in Congo stress the need to deal with sexual violence as a development 
question where the prevention should get at least as much attention as working on the 
consequences.107 ‘We have for a long time been working on the effects and not the causes, 
which are both found in the security and justice sector but also in broader socio-cultural 
gender realities’.108 Increasingly aware of all the problems identified about the way in 
which sexual violence assistance is shaped, organisations and donors slowly began to 
move towards more development-sensitive funding for sexual violence. USAID has been 
mentioned on numerous occasions as being among the first large donors to have recently 
adopted a broader approach, integrating culturally defined gender-differences into its sexual 
violence programming and funding opportunities.109
106 Brusset et al (2010, p.103-115).Within the context of the multi-donor evaluation, the author of this report has been team leader for the DDR 
and SSR component.
107 Interview CNGO-F-1
108 Interview UN-M-5
109 Interview CNGO-F-2, interview UN-F-1
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7
From rape victims to programme
beneficiaries
This chapter addresses the approaches organisations adopt in identifying victim-beneficiaries 
and raises questions about how effective and ethical these are. It will be argued that the 
current programme practices in response to sexual violence encourages beneficiaries to take 
advantage of services and increases the likelihood of would-be victims.
7.1   Management by numbers
Most projects present activities and budgets for ‘X number of victims assisted during 
X period of time’, in line with the log-frame approaches through which donors and 
organisations seek to quantify results in terms of input and output. This management by 
numbers puts pressure on organisations and influences the ways in which they go about 
identifying beneficiaries.
The majority of sexual violence interventions are focused on a limited number of areas, 
whereas other - often highly affected or remote- zones are overlooked, such as, for example, 
Shabunda. This can in part be explained by accessibility, security, infrastructure and 
operational costs. Geographical choices are also influenced by budget-earmarking by donors. 
Many calls for proposals clarify that actions should take place in area X or Y - often areas 
already heavily funded. Most of the sexual violence assistance has been focused in North 
Kivu (Masisi, Rutshuru, Walikale territories) and South Kivu (Walungu, Kabare and Kalehe 
territories). However recently, other zones have been taken into consideration, especially 
under the National Strategy funding scheme, whereby projects have been launched in 
Province Oriental (Kisangani, Dungu) and Ituri. Organisations tend to extend their coverage 
to a large area in order to access multiple sources of funding. Geographical specialisation 
is nearly absent which results in fragmentation of efforts and a superficial and thus limited 
impact at community level.
7.2   Ceasing opportunities
Because there is no central registration system for victims of sexual violence, organisations 
identify beneficiaries simultaneously and in a non-coordinated way. Usually they make use 
of local (women) leaders (‘antennas’, usually social or paralegal worker) that are responsible 
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for identification and receive a small financial bonus in return.110 This strategy is legitimised 
because these women know their communities, are trusted and therefore have easy access to 
victims. There is also a downside to this strategy. Apart from the fact that they may lack the 
abilities to make a sensitive and reliable identification, their position as indirect employees of 
an organisation gives them an interest in keeping the project going. 
A lot of respondents claim that the dispersed nature of beneficiary identification creates a 
tendency towards ‘victim-appropriation’.111 Organisations treat women as ‘their victims’. This 
hampers referral mechanisms and prohibits transparency, as organisations try to hide the 
identity of beneficiaries out of fear that these will be poached by other organisations. Closed-
circle reference schemes between a limited number of organisations that are funded by the 
same donor add to this and creates obstacles to victims of sexual violence that are not within 
the circle to benefit from the services. These practices serve fund-raising and accountability 
purposes, yet raise a serious ethical question on treating victims as ‘commodities’ in terms 
of project-funding. Several respondents used words like ‘force’ and ‘kidnap’ to describe how 
some organisations take women from their villages to put them in urban-based shelters to 
give the organisation the physical possibility to showcase them to donors. One respondent 
reported knowing an organisation ‘whose manager had presented his wife, sisters and even 
neighbours as victims to look for or justify funds’.112
A disturbing reality in the DRC are the occasional mass-violations in areas of continued 
pockets of violent conflict. In the immediate aftermath of an attack to a village where 
mass-rape took place, a large number of organisations travel to the area to list and 
register victims. This leads to multiple enrolments of victims, and thus multiple counts. 
Communities in these areas have the experience that assistance increases when the village 
consists of vulnerable women that are abandoned by their husbands. There are accounts 
of men deliberately leaving the village on the day NGOs come in to register women, as well 
as accounts of women from other villages joining in. A police officer who was involved in 
research of rape claims stated that ‘they even hide the goats and chickens in their homes, 
saying they were looted.’113 These practices are to the detriment of the many women that are, 
in fact, raped during these attacks.
The large offer of services by different organisations invites beneficiaries to take advantage 
of the system. There are many examples of ‘shopping behaviour’. Victims of sexual violence 
exchange information on the organisations that offer most or free assistance and by 
consequence prefer to go there. Others report to different organisations at the same time, 
leading to multiplications of statistics. There are numerous accounts of victims voluntarily 
leaving their communities for areas where assistance is concentrated. ‘One day a victim 
registers herself in Walikale, the next day she is in Sake for the same purpose.’114
110 Interview CNGO-M-2, interview INGO-M-1
111 Interview, GOV-F-2
112 Interview CNGO-M-4
113 Interview GOV-F-1
114 Interview GOV-M-1
7.3   Increasing the likelihood of generating would-be victims
One of the problems that has increased over the years is the presence of would-be victims: 
women who pretend to be raped. International actors consider it unlikely that women 
would pretend to be a victim of rape because rape is an intimate humiliation and beset 
with stigmatisation. Therefore it would be highly unlikely that people that are not raped 
would want to present themselves as victims. All Congolese respondents among our 
interviews dismiss this argument and classify it as a Western value judgement of sensitivities 
surrounding sexual violence. In a context where the population is amongst the poorest in 
the world, the abundant presence of organisations and services is likely to invite abuse and 
people may not feel they have other options to access assistance. 
Congolese community workers and medical personnel relate that they regularly meet women 
that admit that they had not been raped, but fabricated a story to obtain services they 
needed but were only available to rape victims. Some of the respondents gave examples of 
community workers, the ‘antennas’ referred to above, that lure women into saying that they 
have been raped with promises for material and financial assistance.115 The occurrence of 
would-be victims is related to the exclusive targeting of programmes for victims of sexual 
violence.116
The presence of fake victims is probably inevitable. Identifying fake stories would require 
forensic techniques that are lacking. Many organisations, moreover, take the ethical position 
that it is not their role to judge or categorise women that say they have been raped. ’The 
guiding principle has always been that the person approaching you does not lie’.117 However, 
it is important to recognise how certain programme characteristics invite the production of 
fake stories. The fund-driven nature of response to sexual violence and lack of coordination 
opens the door to organisations that lack the professional qualities and attitudes to 
deal with the problem. Tying services to sexual violence, where similar services for the 
population are hardly available or inaccessible, heightens the likelihood that women present 
themselves as a victim of sexual violence. A number of respondents is also convinced that 
a more community-based approach rather than the current victim-oriented approach of the 
programmes could reduce the likelihood of fake reports. 
115 Interview CNGO-F-1
116 Interview INGO-M-1
117 Interview UN-F-7
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8
The legal domain of combatting sexual
violence
This chapter looks in more detail at the justice system and the legal assistance offered 
by NGOs to victims. The analysis presented is based on a review of 40 sexual violence 
cases dealt with by six different tribunals in South Kivu, and 19 interviews. The impunity 
surrounding sexual violence is often seen as an important root-cause of the scale of 
sexual violence in Congo. As a consequence, legal reform and anti-impunity measures are 
increasingly taken up within programmes of organisations and international donors. This 
includes legal assistance for sexual violence victims.
8.1   Dealing with and interpreting the law on sexual violence
As was mentioned earlier, after strong lobbying by Congolese organisations, a law on sexual 
violence was adopted by the Congolese parliament in 2006. The law makes reference to 16 
types of sexual violence. For rape, it foresees between 5 and 20 years imprisonment. Since 
the law was published, a lot of awareness raising programmes have aimed to educate the 
population about its existence and content. As the previous chapter detailed, there are some 
shortcoming to this awareness raising. Nevertheless, it has been successful in the sense that 
most people are currently aware that the law exists.
To make the law operative requires serious reforms of the judicial system. For a long time, 
legal practitioners considered rape cases of inferior interest. They often pointed to the 
victim for having provoked the sexual act and cases were taking a long time to be followed 
up, if they ever were. There are a lot of factors that favour impunity. These include a lack 
of knowledge on procedures and the very tedious and costly procedures that in the end 
discourage the civil party. When rapists are influential people, they are protected and never 
arrested. Suspected rapists can corrupt officials to escape from a process or to escape from 
prison, or to illegitimately grant temporary bail that – without sufficient control mechanisms 
– causes the file to be classified ‘without follow-up’. As a result, from lack of confidence, a 
lot of people never file a case and of the cases introduced only a few result in a judgement. 
It should be mentioned here that the military justice system is generally seen as being more 
pro-active in sexual violence prosecutions than civil courts. 
Since the law was published, legal professionals have felt pressured to take sexual violence 
seriously. The pressure comes from the government that seeks to take its Zero Tolerance 
policy seriously, and from NGOs that offer training and case-monitoring to reduce procedural 
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inconsistencies and corruption. A drawback is that the pressure for a strict application of 
the law creates problems for judges to apply their own common sense to cases that do 
not fit into the rigid framework of the law. This is often the case with teenage love-affairs, 
which are increasingly filed as rape cases in court, especially in urban areas. Normally, 
they don’t reach court unless the families are in conflict over the relationship, especially 
in cases of unplanned pregnancies. Teenage pregnancies are associated with a lack of 
reproductive health knowledge and facilities. Many girls, especially in urban areas, have 
shifting relationships, where complex dynamics play a role and lifestyle is often intertwined 
with forms of transactional sex. Pressured to enact the law on sexual violence that forbids 
underage sex in all its forms, judges have the tendency to punish severely. A mild decision 
would cause outrage with the Congolese public and the international community and ‘judges 
fear to lose their job over it’.118 As a consequence, human rights activists that monitor prison 
conditions state that a lot of the rape suspects and those convicted are relatively young men 
and minors.
Among people in Bukavu and Goma, many stories circulate about how consensual 
relationships or conflicts are framed as rape. Some of these concern adult girls (who are just 
over 18) that generate fake identity papers to claim before court that they are underage. There 
are also accounts of girls that have sexual relationships with older men, in exchange for so-
called ‘sugar-daddy’ benefits like clothes, schooling or housing. There are also accounts of 
girls and women that are believed to deliberately seduce men with the objective of accusing 
them of rape. A large number of men claim to have been arrested and charged with rape 
after they had sex, or simply after inviting a girl or woman for a soft drink. These girls and 
women are believed to collaborate with the police. Most of these cases do not make it to 
court because corrupt police officers use them to force payments from the (wealthy) men 
that are targeted by these staged cases. Two of the people that were interviewed have close 
male relatives that experienced such a case.119 Men that are framed by such practices have no 
choice but to pay their way out.
In Bukavu, a controversy has arisen around the Police for the Protection of Children 
and the fight against Sexual Violence (PNC-PELVS). A variety of people claim that the 
police unit is involved in staging sexual violence for corruption purposes. According 
to the story, the PELVS deliberately sends out girls to seduce men after which a police-
raid is organised to arrest them on sexual violence charges. It takes a large sum of 
money from these men to be released. The PEVLS denies the accusations and claims 
that these are rumours that are spread because the population does not understand 
the work of the police.120 In the present-day DRC, both sides of the story have a ring of 
plausibility.
Box 2: Controversy around the police
118 Interview INGO-F-4
119 Interview INGO-F-2; interview CNGO-M-5
120 Interview GOV-F-2, interview GOV-M-7
For about six months I was together with a married man. He was 55, I’m 22. He had 
rented a small apartment for me. After a while I found out I was pregnant, but he refused 
to accept that the child was his. I panicked. My mother does not have work, how could 
I find the means to pay for things the baby would need once it was born? I heard on the 
radio that girls are assisted in case they are exploited by elderly men. So I told my mother 
that I was going to accuse the man of sexual violence. I was hoping that the police could 
intimidate him so that I could receive money as compensation, because I knew this man 
was rich. But since that day, the police have done nothing with my case. I think he paid 
the police. I lost my hope and stopped following up on it.121
Box 3: Sugar daddy 
The daughter of a woman I worked with in the market, who has at the same time 
extended family, is a very complicated girl. She’s 18 years old and all she does is to sleep 
with a variety of men. Her mother wanted her to stay in my house so that I could provide 
her some advice. She temporarily behaved well, but after one month she started to go 
out again with soldiers and other youngsters from the neighbourhood and fell pregnant. 
I went with her to the hospital for HIV testing and paid for the costs. Then her family 
accused me of sexual violence because I went to the hospital without informing her 
biological mother. Later they said it had been my son who made her pregnant. But my 
son is like a brother to her and denies it firmly. The family of the girl then sent soldiers 
to our house and they arrested my husband for sexual violence and they demanded USD 
4,000 as compensation. Only after I paid USD 22 to the police my husband was released. 
The case is still registered with the police as sexual violence, and the family of the girl 
now claims that she’s only 16 years old for it to be treated more severely by the law. I’m 
waiting for what will happen now. I’m afraid that my son will be locked up for rape and 
that we have to pay that large sum of money, even though he never slept with her. In our 
neighbourhood, nearly all pregnancies of unmarried girls are sooner or later transformed 
into a sexual violence case. In my opinion, rape is abused to get money.122
Box 4: Staging rape charges
These examples, testimonies and rumours highlight a trend whereby knowledge of the sexual 
violence law has brought about a practice of people bending the law to their own interest, either 
to settle conflicts or to criminalise consensual relationships for economic gain. ‘The severity 
of the law is abused; intimidations and requests for money are widespread. People know that 
someone will ‘tremble’ once accused of sexual violence and is immediately ready to give some 
money.’123 This reinforces the perception that sexual violence has become a business and may 
lead to a situation where real sexual violence cases will not be taken seriously. 
121 Interview civilian-F-1
122 Interview civilian-F-2
123 Interview CNGO-M-1
52
54 55
8.2   NGO support to legal reform and legal assistance
An important factor that influences the ways in which the justice system deals with sexual 
violence is the support offered by NGOs. Over recent years, the conviction grew that in order 
to stop impunity and develop the capacities of the judicial system, two types of assistance 
needed to be prioritised. These are training and infrastructural support to improve the 
capacity and working conditions of legal practitioners, and reinforcement of the presence of 
the justice system in rural areas. The latter has been operationalised by the organisation and 
funding of mobile courts (chambres foraines). 
In principle, the Congolese government is responsible for making the funds available to 
ensure that tribunals are built and staffed in rural areas. As this has hardly happened, an 
intermediary mechanism has been introduced whereby legal NGOs financially support 
mobile courts in rural areas. With this funding, NGOs fill in the gap left by the Congolese 
government and show people in rural areas that justice is possible, in order to create 
awareness and build confidence in the justice system. There appears to be a preference for 
funding of military public hearings. This is related to the prevailing idea that military tribunals 
are more effective, and ties in with the idea that sexual violence is linked to the security 
sector.
There are several procedural problems associated with these public hearings. They are set 
in a time frame of 3 to 10 days which may compromise the correct follow up of procedures 
and lead to hurried investigations, or cases that are suspended until another hearing is 
financed.124 Public hearings have, by law, to take place in the community where the offense 
took place, which is not always adhered to. A recent (late 2011) series of public court hearings 
were organised by the American Bar Association in Uvira. The hearings were unlawful in two 
ways. Uvira has a permanent tribunal that can deal with cases,125and the cases dealt with 
during this hearing came from areas as far away as Kalehe and Idwji. To several respondents, 
such examples show that public hearings are in some cases organised to liquidate budgets 
and not because there is a real need for it.
A problematic aspect of these chambres foraines is their bias towards sexual violence cases. 
Although hearings are meant to deal with all kinds of offences, the sponsoring NGOs, 
whose funding is based on sexual violence, is likely to ensure that these cases are prioritised. 
Instead of the tribunal selecting cases, NGOs present the cases to courts that were screened 
by their own lawyers and paralegals.126 This compromises the independence of the judiciary, 
and contributes to legal practices that prioritise sexual violence crimes over other forms of 
(conflict and peacetime) violence. Increasingly, many Congolese feel that the justice system 
has become commandeered by NGOs ‘being the bosses of magistrates’.127
Nearly all NGOs only provide funds for the assistance of victims of sexual violence but the 
defence of suspects is not in their mandate. Suspects have to rely on designated public 
124 Interview GOV-M-3
125 The only reason why a public hearing would legitimately be organized in Uvira is in relation to higher-appeal cases that demands the High 
Tribunal of Bukavu to be brought to Uvira. This was not the case.
126 Interview INGO-F-4
127 Interview CNGO-F-4
defenders with the constraint that those lawyers are never paid by the Congolese state and 
hence usually lack motivation and skills.128 Because NGOs pay for the transport, lodging, 
restoration and per diems of the legal staff during public hearings, this creates a certain 
‘moral debt’ that may result in subjective treatment of cases, in favour of what the NGO is 
looking for: convictions in rape cases. Some NGOs make a certain number of convictions 
part of the benchmark results in their log-frame.
Many NGOs active in the judicial sector acknowledge that ‘mobile courts are not a very 
effective mechanism to strengthen access to justice’129 They make the calculation, however, 
that the courts are in principle a good mechanism where the benefits outweigh the problems. 
They figure that the courts need to be supported, as the government does not pay for them. 
To some observers, the negative side-effects overshadow the positive effects. Overall, 
‘intervening in the justice system is convenient and inconvenient, even though it seems that 
the inconvenient is more present.’ At this moment, there are no rules of engagement, or 
monitoring systems for NGOs that support chambres foraines. 
Apart from mobile hearings, NGOs also fund costs of and monitor the work of permanent 
tribunals. One of the side-effects is that procedures (such as forms or provisional liberty) of 
sexual violence have become more expensive than for other criminal offenses. ‘Somebody 
accused of murder can often obtain provisional liberty against a payment of USD 50, but in 
the case of sexual violence this may rise to USD 300.’130 There are numerous accounts of 
NGOs that put pressure on the legal system not to allow provisional liberty in sexual violence 
cases, even though Congo’s legal framework allows provisional liberty for sexual violence 
under special circumstances. 
8.3   Sexual violence cases analysed
As part of this research, an analysis of 40 sexual violence cases has been conducted. Our 
findings have to be read with caution, as we had to rely on information provided in the case 
files, complemented where possible with interviews (19 in total with judges, court clerks, 
court presidents, public prosecutors and lawyers). The problems we encountered with the 
files confirm some of the problems mentioned in the previous paragraphs. All files concerned 
cases brought before courts, so we cannot say anything about the frequency and number of 
cases that did not go beyond the police level (through corruption or because the case was 
not eligible for prosecution). For nearly 80% of the cases studied, important evidence was 
lacking in the file. The files do not give information about the execution of judgments, which 
is therefore also missing from our analysis. Given the practices we had been told about 
regarding the support of NGOs, we had wanted to include cases that had been supported 
by NGOs. However, the files of such cases were missing entirely from the court clerk’s 
records. This means that the NGOs had withdrawn the file and never returned them. The 
only exceptions were military cases from mobile court hearings that are most likely funded by 
NGOs, although the files were not specific about this. 
128 Interview-CNGO-M-1
129 Interview INGO-F-5
130 Interview CNGO-M-1
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To illustrate the situation with the files in the judiciary, these are the figures from the 
‘Tribunal de Grande Instance de Bukavu’, the court for grave offences, from 2009.
72 cases on sexual violence are listed
33 cases were apparently sent on for higher appeal, files were absent
From the 39 remaining cases: 
18 files contained enough material to include them in our sample
12 files were so incomplete that they were excluded from the sample
9 cases consisted of empty folders 
Interestingly, once the court clerk found out we were interested in sexual violence cases, 
she asked for money for file consultation, although these files are supposed to be freely 
accessible for lawyers. As she stated ‘you are probably funded by NGOs to conduct 
this research, so you should pay’.131 The lack of detail in the file, and the impossibility 
of interviewing all the interested parties for this research, makes it impossible to draw 
conclusions on the verity of the cases and whether suspects were indeed guilty of a crime, or 
not. 
The Table below represents some figures derived from the case analysis. Thereafter, a more 
detailed description of what is presented in the table will be provided, regarding the offense 
and parties involved, the follow-through of procedures, and the case conclusions. 
# Cases
Jurisdictions 
V
ic
tim
s 
m
in
or
s
W
or
ki
ng
 r
el
at
io
n
Fa
m
ily
 r
el
at
io
n
N
ei
gh
bo
ur
 r
el
at
io
n
Su
sp
ec
t u
nk
no
w
n 
to
 th
e 
vi
ct
im
Pr
eg
na
nc
y
R
ap
e 
ch
ar
ge
In
de
ce
nt
 b
eh
av
io
ur
/o
r 
se
xu
al
 h
ar
as
sm
en
t 
C
ru
ci
al
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
ab
se
nt
Le
ga
l t
im
ef
ra
m
e 
re
sp
ec
te
d
Tr
ea
te
d 
du
ri
ng
 p
ub
lic
 
he
ar
in
g
C
on
vi
ct
io
n
R
el
ea
se
TGI (BKV)- 1st
(10 cases)
7 2 1 3 4 1 10 1 9 0 0 3 7
TGI (KVM) - 1st
(5 cases)
4 1 1 0 3 0 5 0 5 0 0 1 4
CA - 2nd
(5 cases)
5 0 2 1 2 2 5 0 2 3 0 4 1
TMG - 1st
(5 cases)
5 0 0 1 4 2 5 0 4 0 5 5 0
CM - 2nd
(5 cases)
2 0 0 0 5 0 5 0 3 0 5 5 0
PGI (BKV) - pré
(10 cases)
6 1 1 0 8 5 10 1 8 n/a n/a n/a n/a
% in total
(40 cases)
72 10 13 13 65 25 100 5 78 10 33 60 40
Table 5: Overview of the cases 132/133/134
131 Direct observation by Congolese researchers. 
132 Explanation of abbreviations: TGI-BKV/KVM (Tribunal de Grande Instance, the Civil Court in respectively Bukavu and Kavumu), CA (Cour 
d’Appèl, the Civil High Appeal Court), TMG (Tribunal Militaire de Grande Instance, the Military Court), CM (Cour Militair, the Military High 
Appeal Court), PGI (Parquet de Grande Intance, the office of the Public Prosecutor). 
133 Concerns files that were classified without follow-up, so no conclusive judgement was ever made.
134 The % in the grey cells are calculated on the basis of 30 cases because those indicators concern prosecution, hence excluding the 10 cases of 
the PGI that were not prosecuted.
Observations linked with the offense and parties involved
•	 Type of sexual violence: All of the cases (N=40) concern charges of rape. In two 
cases the suspect was prosecuted for an additional charge as well: once for sexual 
harassment and once for indecent behaviour. In two-thirds of the cases, the suspect 
was said to be unknown to the victim, the other cases concerned relatives, neighbours 
or work relations.
•	 Rape-related pregnancy: 25% of the cases concerned a pregnancy. 
•	 Age status of civil party and defendant: In 72% of the cases, the civil party is minor, of 
which half fall in the age group up to 14 years, and half in the age-group 14-18 years. 
The high group of young girls point to problems with child abuse that receive little 
attention in writings about sexual violence. In relation to the presumed perpetrators, 
the analysis shows a relatively large representation of young adults. Over half fall in the 
age category up to 25 years.
•	 Status of suspects: None of the studied cases included a suspect with a certain degree 
of wealth or status. They were all men originating from the lower class. In the military 
trials, most suspects are soldiers with a very low ranking and no command status. Out 
of the ten cases studied, seven concern corporals and sergeants (the two lowest ranks 
possible in the Congolese army). This confirms the frequent criticism that judicial 
sexual violence repression is not focusing on senior military figures.135
The high number of pregnancies among the cases, in combination with the youthfulness of 
the victims and perpetrators seems to confirm a pattern emerging from interviews that rape 
cases in DRC today often concern unresolved disputes over the care of babies that may have 
been born from consensual relations. 
Observations linked with the follow-through of procedures
•	 Legal timeframe: The legal timeframe for treatment of sexual violence cases (a 
maximum of three months from instruction to judgement) was respected for three out 
of 30 cases. These three cases were all dealt with in appeal (civil court). All the other 
cases surpassed the legal deadline, with an average procedure taking 6.5 months, 
while the longest took 13 months. At the rural tribunal of Kavumu, first degree case 
procedures took much longer (on average 10 months) than Bukavu-based first degree 
civil and military tribunals. Having said this, sexual violence cases are generally 
handled and concluded faster than other offenses, which may linger on for years.
•	 Chambre	foraine	(mobile	court): None of the civil, but all of the military cases (N=10, 
both 1st and 2nd degree) were treated during a mobile court sitting. Even though it is 
not mentioned as such in the files, it is most likely that those courts were supported 
by NGOs, especially since they prioritise the funding of military public courts over civil 
courts.136
135 Human Rights Watch (2009, p.47).
136 An additional comment to be made here is that the legal expert working on the case analysis was aware of some specific cases that were dealt 
with by NGO-supported mobile courts. When however trying to retrieve these files from the court clerk, they had completely disappeared. 
Quite often it happens that NGOs keep the files in their own administration, hampering a proper tracking record of the jurisdiction in the 
courts. 
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•	 Evidence present in files. Most important pieces of evidence that are expected to be 
present in a sexual violence file are the following: birth certificate, medical attestation 
giving proof of rape, schoolenrolment, medical leaflet, identity cards, or objects that 
were gathered at crime scene. However, for over three-quarters of all cases studied, 
convincing evidence was lacking. 
•	 In 23 of the cases, the file only consisted of procedural notes (such as police reports); 
this was also the case for 8 out of the 19 cases that led to conviction.  
•	 None of the19 convictions contained the legally required medical report as evidence.
•	 In only 1 case, the file made mention of the presence of physical proof (underwear of 
the victim). 
Observations linked with case conclusions
•	 Reasons for suspension: ten of 40 cases did not make it beyond the public prosecutor. 
In five cases, this was caused by the impossibility of finding the suspect. In the other 
5 cases, it was linked to ‘insuffisance de charge’, meaning the public prosecutor did not 
see enough reasons to bring the case to justice either because of the very weak nature 
of evidence or the withdrawal or disappearance of the civil party. Note, however, that 
unrecorded reasons for suspension may include corruption or a lack of police capacity to 
conduct a thorough investigation.
•	 Conclusion of cases: in total, of the cases that were followed-through (N=30) 63% of 
the cases resulted in conviction (19), 37% (11) in acquittal of the suspect. One of the 
convictions included in the analysis was absolved in higher appeal (CA). It is noteworthy 
that all military cases studied (N=10) resulted in conviction, reinforcing the general 
perception that the military justice system is acting severely in relation to rape cases.
•	 Reasons to release: for the 11 cases where the suspect was acquitted, the judges’ 
arguments to support this conclusion were relatively well developed. The motivations 
recorded were, often in combination, the absence of medical proof (mentioned four 
times), the absence of witnesses (twice), the overall absence of proof (four times), the 
constant denial by the suspect (three times), doubt or disappearance of the civil party 
(mentioned), age contradiction of civil party (once) and presence of consent (once). 
•	 Reasons	to	convict: in four out of 19 convictions the fact that the minority of the victim 
was proved was sufficient grounds for conviction. Although none of the cases had 
a medical attestation in the file, three cases nonetheless used ‘medical proof’ as an 
argument to convict. In one case, the fact that the woman gave birth to a child was 
put forward as proof for rape. In another case, the judge found the declarations of the 
parties involved unclear and unconvincing and therefore decided solely on the basis of 
the police report to convict. In another case, the judge based the conviction solely on 
the statement of the victim being ‘plausible’. Finally, in three cases the suspect either 
changed his story all the time or firmly denied guilt, all of which was seen as a sign of 
‘evilness’ and therefore led to the guilty conclusion. For ten convictions it was stated the 
suspect confessed, even though the conditions under which confession was obtained 
is unclear. 
•	 Prison	penalty: of the 19 convictions prison penalties were as follows: five cases got 
penalties less than 5 years of which the lowest was six months (which are all, in view 
of the strict interpretation of the law, illegitimate penalties), nine cases got between 
five and ten years, and five cases the maximum penalty of 20 years. The military 
judgements include the most severe penalties (four out of the five cases got 20 years) 
as well as the least severe (four out of five of the ‘illegal penalties’ of less than five 
years originate from the military tribunal). Given the fact that none of the military cases 
were acquitted, the latter may indicate cases where the judge was in fact not convinced 
yet nonetheless gave a ‘light’ sentence.
•	 Fines	and	compensation: Of the 19 cases, 15 were convicted with penalties ranging from 
USD 100 to USD 800 (USD 220 on average) and compensation payments ranging 
from USD 200 to USD 8,000 (USD 2,030 on average). Three out of the ten military 
convictions also included expulsion from Congo’s army as penalty. None of the files 
included documents proving the actual payment of compensation. The enactment of 
compensation requires a civil procedure for which the victim is expected to pay 6% of 
the allocated sum in advance. This is often impossible for victims to come up with, 
especially the poorest. 
•	 Results of higher appeal: Of the cases that were dealt with in the higher appeal court 
(civil and military) (N=10), one civil conviction was nullified. As for the military second 
degree cases, the higher court confirmed the prison penalties but in all cases (N=5) 
raised the financial penalties pronounced in the lower court. None of the higher appeal 
cases involved complementary research.
On the basis of the information found in the files, as well as their professional expertise, the 
legal analysts involved in this study have made a value judgement in relation to the quality of 
the conclusions of cases. They based their evaluation on the evidence presented combined 
with the judge’s motivation. They concluded that half of the convictions do not have the 
necessary legal backing and represent in fact a violation of the legal rights of the accused. 
It is remarkable from our case studies that cases that result in release are much better 
argued by the judges than the cases that result in conviction. Some of the respondents 
confirmed that this is the case because judges feel the need to defend why in some cases 
they release a suspect. ‘If a presumed perpetrator of sexual violence is found not-guilty by the 
court, the media reports on such cases with disgust and incomprehension, influencing public 
opinion to believe that all suspected perpetrators should be convicted no matter what.’137
8.4   Disregarding legal principles
The law on sexual violence and reforms of the judicial system have resulted in increasing 
attention to cases of sexual violence. This has the potential to stop impunity to sexual 
137 Interview UN-M-4
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violence. It addresses major flaws in the functioning of the justice system that hampers the 
prosecution of perpetrators and make it difficult for the victims to find justice. This chapter 
has mainly focused on unintended consequences of the awareness-raising around the law 
and the judicial practices that have evolved. The outcomes of our interviews and the cases 
we have studied add up to the conclusion that the drive to stop impunity, triggered by the 
atrocious stories of war-related rape, and the concomitant support by NGOs for sexual 
violence cases leads to a situation where suspects are likely to be convicted, regardless of the 
evidence presented to sustain the case. The basic legal principle that suspects are ‘innocent 
until proven guilty’ is hence of little value in Congo, and this is even more so the case with 
military justice. Hence, the possibility should not be excluded that there are currently a lot of 
people, even innocent ones, being convicted for rape even though weaknesses in procedures, 
proof and argumentation should have led to release. What contributes to this likelihood 
is the fact that court cases are biased as suspects are barely represented in court (nobody 
supplies them with lawyers and the public defenders system is weak).
Our interviews point out that the awareness of the law and the current practices of conviction 
have led to an increase in cases where young lovers are convicted, filed by women or their 
relatives to resolve questions of caretaking in cases of pregnancy arising from consensual 
relationships. The analysis of the cases contains some indicators that seem to affirm this 
pattern, i.e. the high level of minors and the high level of pregnancies among them. The 
convictions that NGOs report to their donors may thus be of a different nature from the 
war-related rapes that the donors had in mind. NGOs that support legal cases or public 
hearings may inadvertently lead to the subjective treatment of cases, the lack of respect for 
the suspect’s rights and even influence the outcome of cases. This evolving practice does not 
enhance the quality of justice, but alters injustice by shifting from impunity of suspects to 
bias against suspects. 
9
Conclusion
This research was initiated to address the growing discomfort about programmes against 
sexual violence among staff members of involved agencies and Congolese actors more 
generally. The report concerns the unintended consequences of responses to sexual violence. 
These consequences risk undermining the progress in addressing sexual violence, including 
the work to stop impunity, to raise awareness on sexual violence and the services offered to 
raped women in the DRC. The main recommendation of this report is that these unintended 
consequences need to be discussed and acted upon, in order to retain the positive impact 
of programmes against sexual violence and to prevent them turning against the women for 
whom the response was intended in the first place: the victims of rape.
From our 58 interviews, the 40 legal cases we studied and the documents we consulted, the 
following conclusions emerge and are described below.
•	 Interpretation of sexual violence 
Sexual violence in Congo is mostly seen and represented by the international media as 
rape, and moreover, this is often viewed as extremely brutal conflict-related rape. Many 
agencies worldwide find in this discourse a motivation to address sexual violence in 
DRC. They fail to acknowledge that war-related sexual violence also affects men and 
male victims are rarely assisted.
•	 Socio-cultural	roots	of	sexual	violence 
The war-related interpretation of sexual violence in DRC is narrow and fails to 
recognise that sexual violence is nowadays mainly happening among civilians and 
should partly be understood within the socio-cultural context of gender ideologies 
(masculinity and femininity) and the position of women in the economic, social and 
political domains.
•	 Conflict-related	sexual	violence 
While it is important to recognise that sexual violence is part of the ‘normality’ of 
society and happens outside the conflict dynamics, this is not to deny that conflict 
dynamics do play a role. Pockets of conflict continue and perpetrators of peacetime 
sexual violence may themselves be traumatised by war experiences. It is important 
to note that the very atrocities that triggered the response to violence, sexual crimes 
committed by international troops, fall outside of the scope of current legislation 
and are not being prosecuted. Political and military structures and practices that are 
the legacy of the war continue to be considered one of the causal problems of sexual 
violence.
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• Governance and the legal system 
The impunity of sexual violence associated with imperfections in the legal system and 
corruption in relation to arrest and prosecution has led to many initiatives to bring 
rape suspects to court. However, the response mechanisms continue to be governed 
by the same imperfections and practices that characterize the Congolese justice 
system. As a result, justice continues to be difficult to achieve and may lead to new 
biases towards convicting suspects of sexual violence that are themselves vulnerable 
in terms of their age, socio-economic position and – in the case of military – low ranks. 
The 19 convictions from 40 cases that were reviewed all lacked crucial evidence. None 
of the files contained evidence of medical examinations. Our legal experts considered 
50% of the convictions ungrounded.
•	 The	use	of	statistics 
There are many problems with data gathering and analysis. Whereas the taboo on 
sexual violence was considered so stringent that this would lead to under-reporting 
of sexual violence, we also find the opposite in current practices. Among the factors 
contributing to inflated statistics are deliberate exaggeration for fund-raising, 
double counts for lack of transparency, medical treatment of non-victims in need 
of care, practices of would-be victims and multiple registrations by beneficiaries of 
programmes. Data are often not specific on types of sexual violence reported, details 
on the localities in which data were collected, and the timeframe during which reported 
offenses took place. Furthermore, most international actors rely on the accounts of a 
limited number of Congolese sources. The use of data with extrapolations and one-
liner media representations reinforces the stereotypical notion of war-related brutal 
rape. The subsequent representations of the DRC as the ‘rape capital of the world’ 
undermines the constituency among DRC actors for combating sexual violence.
•	 Actors	and	budgets 
The large budgets available for combating sexual violence have led to a multiplication 
of organisations on the ground which are not sufficiently coordinated or monitored 
for their capacities. As a result, initiatives range from sincere and professional to 
those that act as ‘gold diggers’ and use human suffering to obtain funds. International 
budgets completely overwhelm resources dedicated to deal with sexual violence by the 
DRC government, contributing to a developing perception that sexual violence is an 
issue imposed and managed by international actors. 
•	 Budgets	and	approaches 
The analysis of sexual violence budgets reveals that these are highly directed towards 
curative assistance to victims of violence. Much less attention is given to measures to 
resolve sexual violence, especially by addressing gender relations and cultural practices 
at the community level, by strengthening women’s positions and fostering women’s 
leadership, and by addressing continuing problems in the domain of security, peace 
building and justice. The budgets available to sexual violence under Multi-Donor Trust 
Funds are relatively high compared to, for example, budgets for general health issues 
(30% higher than sexual violence assistance), education and security sector reform 
(each one is half of the value of budgets available for sexual violence).
•	 The	type	of	assistance 
Most of the projects claim to adopt a holistic approach to assistance, seeking to 
combine medical, psycho-social, economic and legal assistance to victims. However, 
the programmes display a ‘humanitarian style’ with short durations and an emphasis 
on assisting individual victims. This is seen to hinder more preventive, socio-cultural 
and community-based interventions. Targeting programmes on victims of sexual 
violence is especially problematic in medical care, where sexual violence programmes 
in practice compensate for the lack of reproductive health facilities. The two most 
renowned hospitals for the treatment of fistulas report respectively that only 3% (Heal 
Africa), and only one out of 350 cases last year (Pansi hospital) were reportedly the 
result of rape, while the others all resulted from childbirth.
•	 Awareness	raising	programmes 
These efforts have succeeded in creating knowledge of sexual violence, highlighting 
messages that sexual violence will not be tolerated and will be punished, as well as 
disseminating the notion that victims are never to be blamed. But these messages are 
on many occasions difficult to understand in a context where most forms of sexual 
violence recognised in the 2006 law are still part of customary practices. Awareness 
raising falls short in not addressing predominant gender relations in the context of the 
criminalisation of those practices. It also leads to cases where disputes resulting from 
consensual relations lead to fabricated accusations of sexual violence.
•	 Beneficiary	identification 
The emphasis on numbers in project management has created a situation in 
which beneficiaries are ‘appropriated’ by organizations and it leads at times to the 
‘commoditisation’ of victims who are brought in to justify activities and expenditures. 
Beneficiary identification usually prioritises certain (accessible) areas, which 
become ‘assistance-hubs’ at the expense of other localities where sexual violence is 
concentrated. Targeting services for victims of sexual violence, leads to services that 
are reserved for victims of sexual violence, while alternative services are hardly available. 
International agencies maintain that their programmes are protected against ‘abuse’ 
because the stigma attached to rape would inhibit women from presenting a fake case. 
None of the Congolese respondents supports this view. They maintain that women in 
dire need of medical or socio-economic assistance will pretend to be a victim of sexual 
violence. Reserving services for victims of sexual violence and the related assumption 
that assistance seekers are all victims of sexual violence clouds the analysis of trends 
and problems for women. There is no attention to the prevention of birth-related 
fistulas and little attention to address problems resulting from teenage pregnancies. 
•	 Legal	support	by	NGOs	and	the	judicial	treatment	of	sexual	violence	cases 
NGO support to the justice sector takes place through training, contributions to 
improving working conditions, the accompaniment of rape cases, and financial 
support for organising public hearings (chambre foraine). While the culture of impunity 
is effectively changing, it has resulted in a system that is biased towards producing 
rape convictions, while the rights of suspects are severely compromised. Judicial actors 
feel pressured by the zero-tolerance policy of the government, the advocacy of NGOs, 
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and public opinion to convict suspects. As a result they disregard actual evidence to 
support cases and become biased and subjective in their rulings. This is even more so 
when NGOs pay for organising the mobile court hearings and select the cases to be 
heard. 
These conclusions are based on research focusing in North and South Kivu, where most 
of the sexual violence funding is made available. They do not apply to other provinces of 
the DRC. The research concerns the array of interventions, and looks into perceptions and 
societal responses to these interventions. The substantiation of the trends we observe and 
the recognition of diversity in objectives and quality of individual programmes, requires 
additional research at programme level. The research has been limited to the DRC and 
can therefore not be understood as valid for other countries. Additional research would be 
required in other countries where (war-related) sexual violence has triggered international 
responses, such as Northern Uganda. 
The different processes that we have observed are strongly inter-related and have set in 
motion a negative spiral in which sexual violence accounts evoke responses that are prone to 
abuse by organisations and misuse by victims (and non-victims) and which, in turn, leads to 
exaggerated figures that add to the statistics evoking responses. The negative spiral results 
in the increasing commercialisation of sexual violence, where sexual violence is considered a 
business for agencies and individuals. The consequences are grave. It erodes the Congolese 
constituency for combating sexual violence. It directs attention away from the socio-cultural 
gender relations in which much sexual violence is rooted. It leads to an increasing cynicism 
to the problem with the result that real victims of sexual violence are no longer heard. It 
leads to biased problem statements, policies and programmes that fail to address the 
domestic character of sexual violence, the lack of reproductive health, the prevention of 
teenage pregnancies, the malfunctioning of justice and the dire poverty underlying requests 
for assistance. To break through this negative spiral, and live up to the intentions of the 
responses to sexual abuse to stop impunity, assist victims and reduce sexual violence, the 
response system to sexual abuse needs to be evaluated and reformed. 
This leads to the following recommendations to international and Congolese actors 
concerned with sexual violence:
•	 There	is	a	need	to	move	away	from	the	predominant	‘rape	as	a	result	of	conflict’	
discourse. Instead, efforts need to be made to understand sexual violence in its 
context, with particular attention to its socio-cultural gender dimensions. 
•	 As	most	of	the	assistance	has	focused	on	the	relief	of	the	consequences	for	
victims, assistance programmes need to be more strongly embedded in longer-
term development approaches that deal with root causes (while continuing to 
address remaining humanitarian needs). This involves addressing gender relations, 
strengthening the position of women, fostering women’s leadership, increasing 
respect for human rights, intensifying security, justice and reform measures, and 
seeking community-based responses to sexual violence. 
•	 To	address	the	problem	of	would-be	victims	and	its	negative	consequences,	it	is	
important to recognise the underlying factors of poverty and lack of healthcare. The 
mandate of medical care must be broadened to incorporate reproductive health, 
especially to cater to and prevent women with fistulas from child-birth. Socio-economic 
interventions should be community-based and take into account the lessons learnt 
from programmes for ex-combatants. 
•	 Interventions	in	the	justice	sector	need	to	ensure	the	independent	functioning	of	
Congolese legal actors and should guarantee fair and equal procedures for all parties 
involved. Promoting convictions for sexual violence, especially through ‘quick-fix’ 
procedures in funded mobile courts, leads to severe biases in the justice system and 
the breach of the rights of suspects.
•	 The	coordination	of	sexual	violence	programmes	needs	to	be	improved	and	made	
more integral to overall development planning. Parallel health and legal services 
targeting sexual violence victims should be avoided. The communication and 
coordination between international actors, Congolese government and civil society 
needs to be improved. The political and financial commitment of the Congolese 
government to reform measures necessary to combat sexual violence need to be 
concretised. 
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Annex 2: Resource persons
As many of the respondents requested that their points of view were to be taken into 
consideration as individual points of view, not engaging the organisation they work for, it has 
been decided to quote respondents in a coded manner. The coding system makes reference 
to the gender of the respondent (F/M) and the type of organisation they work for: UN (UN 
agency), INGO (international NGO), CNGO (Congolese NGO) and GOV (government 
agency). Each respondent has also been given a number, hence resulting in coding like 
GOV-F-1, INGO-M-6, CNGO-F-3 or UN-M-4. 
The following organisations and institutes have been interviewed. On some occasions 
more than one person was present during the interview, for other structures a number of 
employees were interviewed separately, hence resulting in the total number of 58 interviews. 
The numerical part of the coding does not reflect the order in which they are presented below 
and has been attributed at random.
Goma
UN structures: MONUSCO-SGBV, UNICEF, JHRO-MONUSCO, UNHCR, UNDP, UNFPA
Government: Provincial gender division, Provincial Health Inspection, Police PLVS, Provincial 
Justice Division, Tribunal de Grande Instance
INGOs: Medecins du Monde, International Rescue Committee, Finn Church Aid, American 
Bar Association, Heal Africa
CNGOs: DFJ, SFVS,ACAT, SOPROP, ASPD, OCP
Bukavu
UN structures: UNFPA, UNICEF, MONUSCO-SGBV, UNHCR
Government: Tribunal de Grande Instance (Bukavu and Kavumu), Cours d’Appel, Parquet, 
Police PLVS, Provincial Gender Division
INGOs: American Bar Association, ICCO-KerkinActie, International Alert, Avocats Sans 
Frontières
CNGOs: PanziFoundation, OCET, Caucus des Femmes, RFDP, CAMPS
73
Annex 3: Data collection tools
Topics for semi-structured interviews with actors
Representation and interpretation of sexual violence
•	 What is over the years the evolution in how sexual violence in Congo is understood?
•	 Is the current interpretation of sexual violence doing justice to reality? Why (not)?
•	 What are factors that you feel influence the interpretation of sexual violence?
•	 What should in your opinion be changed in which sexual violence is represented?
The focus and effects of (the organisation’s) activities
•	 What is the focus and type of projects are implemented? 
•	 How are beneficiaries selected and dealt with?
•	 What is the role and influence of by donors in the field of sexual violence 
programming ?
•	 Has sexual violence programming and funding over the years in your opinion been 
effective in addressing existing needs in a context sensitive manner? Why, why not?
Coordination
•	 Which coordination schemes for sexual violence assistance exist?
•	 What observations do you have in relation to the effectiveness of coordination?
The use of statistics
•	 Are statistics important to grasp the problem? Why, why not?
•	 Which shortcomings can be observed with the collection, analysis and interpretation of 
data on sexual violence? 
•	 What are the effects of using statistics that are beset by those shortcomings?
Juridical assistance and support offered by NGOs
•	 Why is juridical assistance in your opinion justified? What is its focus currently?
•	 What is your opinion on mobile courts, what are its strengths and weaknesses?
•	 What are factors that cause impunity around sexual violence cases?
•	 In what ways the law on sexual violence is applied in a counter-productive manner?
Examples of unwanted side-effects
•	 Do you know examples of side-effects? Which ones?
•	 What is your analysis/opinion of the examples you gave? 
Consequences and risks of the presence of such side-effects
•	 In what ways is there attention for and debate about those side-effects?
•	 What are potential risks if those side-effects are not addressed?
•	 Recommendations and alternatives
•	 What would you like to see changed in the way sexual violence is dealt with in 
programming?
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In conclusion
•	 ‘Sexual violence has become a business’, is this statement in your opinion true or 
false? Do what degree and why?
Framework for the legal analysis of sexual violence cases
Quantitative analysis 
•	 Nombre d’acquittements, nombre de condamnations (et à quel peine), nombre de 
dossiers classés sans suite, durée de la procédure (instruction par chambre foraine ou 
pas), type d’infraction, type d’acteur, l’âge de la victime (mineure ou majeure), nombre 
de cas traités en appel
Qualitative analysis
•	 Quels cas sont conclus par une condamnation alors que les éléments de preuves 
présentés dans les dossiers devraient amener le tribunal à acquitter
•	 Quels sont les cas conclu par un acquittement alors que les éléments de preuves 
présentés dans le dossier devraient amener le tribunal à condamner
•	 Pour quels cas des pièces manquent (et lesquels pièces, quel est leur importance, 
pourquoi ça manque dans le dossier – est-ce que c’est une instruction incomplet ou 
par volonté/corruption)
•	 Est-ce qu’il existe de pièces dans un ou plusieurs dossiers qui ont l’allure d’être 
fabriqué, comment le savoir
•	 Pour les cas qui ont été traités en appel, est-ce qu’il existe des incompatibilités par 
rapport aux arguments/faits présentés (nouveaux éléments, éléments changés)
•	 Qu’est-ce qu’on constate par rapport au nombre de cas ou la victime n’a pas été 
remise dans ces droits (acquittement, légère peine, présumé pris fuite)
•	 Qu’est-ce qu’on peut observer par rapport au traitement juridiques des cas jugés en 
chambre foraine ? (eg. durée, profondeur de l’enquête, influence des ONGs, effets)
•	 Qu’est-ce qu’on constate (différence, comparaison) par rapport aux cas traités par la 
justice militaire et ceux traités par la justice civile
•	 Qu’est-ce qu’on constate (différences, comparaison) par rapport aux cas traités par le 
tribunal de grande instance et ceux traités par le tribunal de Kavumu
•	 Sur base des cas étudies (ou votre expérience personnel), quels généralisations ou 
analyses peuvent être faits par rapport à la légèreté, l’influence de corruption, trafic 
d’influence et les faux condamnations qui peuvent exister au tour de dossiers de 
violences sexuelles 
Please note that not all the questions above have been answered or dealt with in detail in 
the judicial analysis. On the basis of the file-analysis it proved impossible to formulate a 
conclusive response to some of the questions. 
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Her publications focus on the everyday practices of humanitarian aid, disaster risk reduction, 
climate change adaptation, reconstruction and peace building. She coordinates research 
programmes in Angola, DRC, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Sudan, Mozambique and Uganda. Her 
programme in DRC consists of research into community-drive reconstruction, livelihoods in 
the artisanal mining sector and research into basic services and livelihoods. Thea Hilhorst 
is the Director of the Netherlands MFA-funded IS Academy research programme: Human 
Security in Fragile States, and she is a member of the DFID-funded and ODI-led ‘Secure 
Livelihoods Research Consortium’. Thea Hilhorst completed her dissertation in 2000 on a 
Philippine development NGO and its surrounding networks, clientele and donors (The Real 
World of NGOs. Discourses, Diversity and Development, Zedbooks). www.disasterstudies.wur.nl
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Acronyms
ABA American Bar Association
ASF Avocats Sans Frontières 
ASPD Action Social pour la Paix et le Développement 
CA Cour d’Appel
CAMPS Centre d’Assistance Médico Psychosociale 
CBO Community Based Organization
CM Cour Militaire
COOPI Cooperazione Internazionale
COOPI International Italian Cooperation
CORDAID Catholic Organisation for Relief and Development 
CPLVS Comité Provincial de la Lutte Contre les Violences Sexuelles
CTLVS Comité Territorial de la Lutte Contre les Violences Sexuelles 
DRC Democratic Republic of Congo
FARDC Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo 
FDD Forces for the Defense of Democracy
FDLR Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda
FNL Forces Nationales de Libération
HIV Human Immunodeficiency Virus
ICCO Inter-Church Organisation for Development Cooperation
IMC International Medical Corps
IPS Inspection Proviciale de la Santé
ISSSS International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy
JHRO-MONUSCO Joint Human Rights Office-MONUSCO
MDTF Multi Donor Trust Fund
MONUSCO Mission de Nations Unies au Congo
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
OCHCR Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
PEP-kit Post Exposure Prophylaxis
PELVS Police d’Enfance et la Lutte contre les Violences Sexuelles
PF Pooled Fund
PGI Parquet de Grande Instance
PNC Police Nationale Congolaise
REJUSCO Restoration of the Judicial System in Eastern Congo
RFDP Réseau de Femmes pour le Développement et la Paix 
SCIAF Scottish Catholic International Aid Fund
SFVS Synergie des Femmes Contre les Violences Sexuelles 
SGBV Sexual and Gender Based Violence
SRFF Stabilization and Recovery Funding Facility
STAREC Stabilization Strategy for Eastern Congo
STD Sexually Transmitted Disease
TGI Tribunal de Grande Instance
TMG Tribunal Militaire de Grande Instance
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UN United Nations
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNFPA United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNICEF United Nations Children and Education Fund
UNOPS United Nations Office for Project Services
WUR Wageningen University and Research Centre
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Disaster Studies focuses on conflict, natural disasters and development, and on the dynamics of aid interventions. It offers education, research, 
PhD supervision and policy advice. It contributes with qualitative research to multi-disciplinary approaches. Disaster Studies combines academic 
teaching and research with a desire to enhance policy discussions and local and international responses to disaster and conflict.
